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ABSTRACT  
 
During the 1960s, the long-standing idea that traits or behaviors could be 
explained  by  natural  selection  acting  on  traits  that  persisted  “for  the  good  of  the  group”  
prompted a series of debates about group-level selection and the effectiveness with which 
natural selection could act at or across multiple levels of biological organization. For 
some this topic remains contentious, while others consider the debate settled, even while 
disagreeing about when and how resolution occurred, raising the question: “Why have 
these debates continued?” 
Here I explore the biology, history, and philosophy of the possibility of natural 
selection operating at levels of biological organization other than the organism by 
focusing on debates about group-level selection that have occurred since the 1960s. In 
particular, I use experimental, historical, and synthetic methods to review how the 
debates have changed, and whether different uses of the same words and concepts can 
lead to different interpretations of the same experimental data. 
I begin with the results of a group-selection experiment I conducted using the 
parasitoid wasp Nasonia, and discuss how the interpretation depends on how one 
conceives of and defines a “group.”  Then  I review the history of the group selection 
controversy and argue that this history is best interpreted as multiple, interrelated debates 
rather than a single continuous debate. Furthermore, I show how the aspects of these 
debates that have changed the most are related to theoretical content and empirical data, 
while disputes related to methods remain largely unchanged. Synthesizing this material, I 
distinguish  four  different  “approaches”  to  the  study  of  multilevel  selection  based  on  the  
questions and methods used by researchers, and I use the results of the Nasonia 
  ii 
experiment to discuss how each approach can lead to different interpretations of the same 
experimental data. I argue that this realization can help to explain why debates about 
group and multilevel selection have persisted for nearly sixty years. Finally, the 
conclusions of this dissertation apply beyond evolutionary biology by providing an 
illustration of how key concepts can change over time, and how failing to appreciate this 
fact can lead to ongoing controversy within a scientific field. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Few subjects in biology are as fundamental to the discipline as the study of 
natural selection. Arguments about the function and effectiveness of natural selection 
date to Darwin’s  work  before publication of the first edition of On The Origin of Species 
in 1859 and remain a consistent part of discussions about evolutionary theory. Although 
the theory of evolution by natural selection is no longer a controversial topic in 
evolutionary biology, the question of how or if natural selection works at levels of 
organization other than the individual remains contentious.  
The  idea  of  “group  selection”  or  natural  selection  acting  upon  groups  of 
organisms rather than only on organisms or their genes has a long history of use, by some 
readings  dating  back  to  Darwin’s  own  work (Borrello 2010). A series of rigorous 
discussions during the 1960s about whether group-level selection could be an effective 
cause of an evolutionary response triggered both controversy and debates about the topic 
and led to decades of arguments and disagreements about the appropriate way(s) to 
conceptualize selection working across multiple levels of biological organization. 
My project concerns why controversy has continued for one particular case of 
multilevel selection regarding groups as a level at which natural selection may or may not 
operate effectively. In particular, my research affords a way to understand the 
contemporary group-selection debate in its historical, scientific, and philosophical 
contexts by synthesizing across these disciplines. In doing so, I illustrate the role that 
conceptual change has played in the controversy about group-level selection over the past 
sixty years, and argue that both conceptual clarity as well as empirical evidence are 
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necessary to resolve the controversy. While the necessity of conceptual clarity might 
seem obvious, and some researchers worked to create such clarity, my research 
demonstrates that the failure by some to acknowledge how concepts change over time has 
contributed to the ongoing controversy within this field of study. Finally, understanding 
the conceptual change within this controversy helps us to appreciate the current state of 
knowledge regarding multilevel selection and reveals the varied definitions, questions, 
and methods that future researchers will want to be aware of for their own projects. 
The first chapter of this dissertation describes an experiment that asked whether 
groups of five female wasps housed collectively would respond to selection for increased 
population size. Yet, as I describe, interpretation of the otherwise straightforward results 
is  confounded  by  a  multiplicity  of  implicit  definitions  for  the  term  “group.”  In  other  
words, despite decades of theoretical and empirical research on the topic of group-level 
selection, interpretations of empirical data vary depending upon the definition of  “group”  
that is used. 
The second chapter builds upon this conclusion by asking why the controversy 
surrounding the study of group-level selection has continued for so long, particularly 
highlighting the fact that researchers disagree about if and when any resolution occurred. 
In this chapter, I compare the group selection controversy of the 1980s, represented by 
David  Sloan  Wilson’s  (1983) review, with the current state of discussions and debates 
regarding both group-level selection and the broader theoretical framework of multilevel 
selection (MLS). In doing so, I provide a review of modern MLS theory as well as 
demonstrate the ways in which the debates about levels of selection have and have not 
changed. Using this account, I argue that the history of the group selection controversy is 
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best interpreted as multiple, interrelated debates rather than a single continuous debate. 
Furthermore, I show the aspects of these debates that have changed the most are those 
related to the theoretical content and empirical data available, while disputes related to 
methods remain largely unchanged. 
Finally, the third chapter builds upon the first two in order to provide a framework 
for understanding the ongoing disputes about group selection, and multilevel selection 
more  generally,  by  arguing  that  there  are  different  “approaches”  to  the  study  of  multilevel  
selection distinguished by where the research falls upon two axes: 1) whether the 
researcher is primarily interested in a single level of organization or multiple levels, and 
2) the extent to which the work starts from a theoretical or empirical perspective. I then 
describe  four  such  “approaches”  including  the  questions asked and the methods used and 
discuss how these approaches might lead to conflicting interpretations of empirical data 
by using the Nasonia experiment from chapter 1 as an example. By acknowledging these 
different approaches, it becomes clear why some of the controversy surrounding group 
selection continues, and in doing so provides potential avenues for avoiding the same 
conflicts in future research. 
This project offers valuable insights for other fields of study that rely upon an 
understanding of natural selection. In particular, researchers in the burgeoning study of 
complex adaptive systems (CASs)—hierarchically organized systems in which lower 
level entities interact to produce emergent properties at higher levels of organization—
have drawn upon evolutionary theory and natural selection, either implicitly or explicitly, 
when analyzing CASs since one key element of a CAS is its ability to respond to various 
selection pressures, which is easily seen in biological CASs.  
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This CAS interest in selection working across hierarchal levels has created a 
strong theoretical  dependence  not  only  upon  biologists’  notions  of  natural  selection,  but  
natural selection occurring at multiple levels of organization, either by considering what 
kinds of levels or organizations are capable of responding to selection or by considering 
how selection might act simultaneously across levels. Because of this, it is particularly 
important to understand the ways that biologists have conceptualized natural selection 
occurring across multiple levels of biological organization. Of course, the ongoing 
controversy on the subject can make this a challenging task. But this project offers an 
account of how biologists and philosophers of biology have conceptualized natural 
selection working across multiple levels of biological organization over the last 60 years.  
Finally, the lessons that this project offers extend beyond the subject of natural 
selection. As David Sloan Wilson (1983) noted, a description of the history, philosophy, 
and biology involved in the controversy over group selection provides a striking example 
of scientific discourse, including a demonstration of the interrelated roles of empirical 
evidence and theory generation, as well as an illustration of the benefits that philosophers 
of biology can offer to subjects such as this. But more than that, this dissertation also 
illustrates how the use of key concepts can change over time, and how failing to 
acknowledge and appreciate this fact can lead to ongoing controversy within a scientific 
field of study. The conclusion that there are multiple approaches to the study of 
multilevel selection also offers insights for other sciences by demonstrating how different 
interpretations of empirical data can arise and suggesting a way of understanding ongoing 
controversy in other fields of research. 
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CHAPTER 1 
A TEST OF GROUP-LEVEL SELECTION FOR INCREASED POPULATION SIZE IN 
THE PARASITOID WASP NASONIA VITRIPENNIS 
Abstract 
I describe the results of a selection experiment using the parasitoid wasp Nasonia 
to test if five females housed in a single vial would respond to selection for increased 
population  size  at  the  “group-level”  collective  of  five  wasps.  I  show  no  response  to  
selection in the form of an increase in mean population size; however, the sex ratio of the 
group treatment did change. The results of this experiment also suggest that female 
Nasonia adjust the sex ratio of their broods in ways that at least partially depend upon 
conditions that they have experienced previously, by increasing the relative proportion of 
males in future broods after they have encountered other females, or decreasing the 
proportion of males in future broods after initially encountering no other females.  
In discussing the outcome of this experiment, I highlight the challenge of 
interpreting the results because any interpretation is predicated upon how one conceives 
of  a  “group.”  That  is,  by  some  definitions  of  “group”  this  experiment  was  a  case  of  
group-level selection that failed to result in a response to the target of selection, while by 
other  definitions  of  “group”  this experiment failed to include group-level selection at all. 
That such varied interpretations arise from different definitions of a group demonstrates 
the importance of understanding the history of such conceptual change, and why 
experimentalists must be clear about the concepts upon which their research designs are 
based since conceptual change might influence the interpretation of their results. 
  6 
 
Introduction 
The possibility that natural selection might act at more than one level of 
biological organization—either independently or simultaneously—has a rich history of 
theoretical analysis (Borello 2010; Hamilton and Dimond 2012). There are also empirical 
analyses examining the levels at which selection might act that cover a range of 
experimental conditions and study organisms. These have included flour beetles (Wade 
1976, 1977, Craig, 1982; Wade and Goodnight, 1991), cress and jewelweed plants 
(Goodnight 1985; Stevens et al. 1995), domesticated chickens (Muir 1996, Craig and 
Muir 1996), livebearing fish (Baer et al. 2000), parasitic nematodes (Bashey and Lively 
2009), as well as other species summarized by Goodnight and Stevens (1997).  
Of the above studies, only one used a parasitic species, and none of the studies 
used a haplodiploid species. Continuing to add to the species and conditions studied at 
the group level will add to our comparative understanding of the possibility of selection 
at multiple levels. Here, I present the results of a selection experiment with the parasitoid 
wasp Nasonia vitripennis. Nasonia has a long history as a study system for facultative 
sex ratios and the effects of inclusive fitness (Werren 1980; Parker and Orzack 1985; 
Pannebakker et al. 2011). Additionally, Nasonia behavior, including the ability of 
females to adjust the sex ratio of their broods (Burton-Chellew et al, 2008), and the 
patchy distribution of their hosts (Grillenberger et al. 2008), suggest that Nasonia might 
be subject to selection at levels other than just the organism.  
I asked if a collective of five female Nasonia housed in a single vial (patch) 
would respond to selection for increased population size and compared this response to 
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the response when females were housed alone and selected for increase number of 
offspring. Thus, the targets of selection for this multilevel selection experiment were the 
“group-level”  collective  of  five  wasps,  following  similar  designs in other studies of 
group-level selection (e.g., Wade 1976, 1977), and the organismal-level individuals. 
I predicted that there would be a response to selection in the group-level treatment 
because of the similarities between my experimental design and other group-level 
selection experiments (e.g., Wade 1976; Bashey and Lively 2009). Specifically, I 
expected to see an increase in mean population size. Furthermore, because of previous 
research on the ability of Nasonia to change sex ratios facultatively for each clutch of 
eggs, I also predicted that the sex ratios would show an increase in the number of males 
relative to females as part of the overall response to selection on groups of wasps. 
 
Methods 
Study organism: The parasitoid wasp genus Nasonia has four species: N. 
vitripennis, N. giraulti, N. longicornis, and N. oneida. Three of the four species cannot 
cross-fertilize due to cytoplasmic incompatibilities caused by their endosymbiont 
Wolbachia (Bordenstein and Werren 2007). Nasonia have a haplodiploid sex 
determination system and, because Nasonia generation times are approximately 14 days 
at 24 degrees C, have been used as a study system to test sex ratio theory (Werren 1980; 
Parker and Orzack 1985; Orzack et al 1991; Ivens et al. 2009; Beukeboom and Van de 
Zande 2010). Knowledge of the complete genome of N. vitripennis (Werren et al. 2010) 
also opens the possibility for researchers to track genetic changes underlying phenotypic 
variation. Although popular as an evolutionary genetics study system (Beukeboom and 
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Desplan 2003), Nasonia species have not been used for exploring questions related to 
levels of selection even though the same characteristics that make Nasonia an ideal 
system for experimental studies of evolution and genetics also suggest that it could be 
useful for multilevel selection studies. 
Experimental population: I used the ASU Remix (ASURx) population, a 
laboratory population of N. vitripennis created for this project by combining eight N. 
vitripennis laboratory strains (see Appendix A). 
Selection target: Numerous experiments studying group and multilevel selection 
have  used  the  trait  “population  size”  as  the  target  of  selection  (e.g.,  Wade  1976,  1977;;  
Wade and Goodnight 1990a, 1990b; Baer et al. 2000; Bashey and Lively 2009). I used 
the same trait for this experiment in order to compare my results with previous studies. 
However, because Nasonia is a parasitic wasp, the available resources – fly larvae – had 
to be standardized. I did this by selecting upon the number of adult wasps per standard 
resource, as described below. In each treatment I maintained a larval host-to-wasp ratio 
of 2:1, and I used the total mass of hosts to standardize the available resources for each 
group. I then counted the number of adult wasps that emerged in each vial and divided by 
number of hosts successfully parasitized, so as not to penalize groups for any dead hosts. 
Thus, the direct target of selection was number of adult offspring per standardized host. 
Defining and selecting upon population size in this way also allowed for the same 
character to be selected in the group and organismal treatments, as further described in 
the experimental design section. 
Group size: N. vitripennis females parasitize blowfly and fleshfly pupae found in 
bird nests or dung piles (Fig. 1.1), typically laying between 20 and 40 eggs in a single 
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host (Werren, 1980). Multiple females often parasitize a single patch, and the mean 
number of N. vitripennis foundresses vary from 2.3 per nest (limits 1 to 9) (Molbo and 
Parker, 1996) to 3 per patch (limits 1 to 7) (Grillenberger et al. 2008). Multiple females 
will also parasitize the same host pupa, with observed rates of superparasatism—
parasitism of a host by more than one female Nasonia—ranging from 40% of all sampled 
patches containing a superparasatized host (Grillenberger et al. 2008) to 100% of the 
patches visited by more than one female containing a superparasatized host (Molbo and 
Parker, 1996). 
                                    
 
Figure 1.1 Comparison of organizational levels for Nasonia habitat in nature and 
laboratory.  
Image on the left represents the levels of organization in a bird nest (A) with fly pupae 
(B) within which Nasonia eggs develop (C). Image on the right represents levels of 
organization in the laboratory, with vials (A) containing the fly pupae (B) in which 
Nasonia eggs develop (C).  
 
To approximate conditions similar to those observed, I created “groups” for this 
experiment by placing five mated females into a single vial with access to 10 fly pupae as 
hosts (Fig 1.1). While this number of wasps is greater than the mean number that would 
typically parasitize a single patch, it is within the limits of observed populations. Creating 
groups with five females also increased the likelihood of superparasitism and other forms 
of interaction between individuals within each group, which is essential for some 
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definitions  of  a  “group”  (e.g.,  Wilson,  1975)  and  is  thought to be important for increasing 
the potential for between-group differences upon which selection can act (e.g., Goodnight 
and Stevens 1997). 
Experimental design: I used a nested design with two treatments: the group 
treatment and the organismal treatment. Within each treatment were two environmental 
conditions that each female encountered: a collective context with a group of five wasps 
and a solitary context with each wasp housed alone. The entire experiment had three 
replicates.  
The purpose of the group treatment was to test if groups of five female wasps in a 
single vial with equal access to a common store of hosts would respond to selection on 
the size of the population in the vial. After 2 days, these same females were transferred 
individually into the solitary context vials, maintaining the same ratio of hosts per wasp. 
This solitary context following the collective context provided a comparison of the 
females’  behavior  when  not  in  the  presence  of  other  females,  including  an  analysis  of  
how the mean population size produced by the group compared with the total offspring of 
the same wasps housed separately. Note that within the group treatment, artificial 
selection was only exerted upon the collective context.  
The purpose of the organismal treatment was to serve as a comparison to the 
group treatment by selecting on the same character in a solitary context. Because the 
comparison was intended to be at the level of the vial—for population sizes—rather than 
match the same number of females between the group and organismal treatments, I 
matched the number of vials. Thus, I had 5 group vials in each replicate and 5 organismal 
vials in each replicate (Figure 1.2). In the organismal treatment, the collective context, 
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with all 5 wasps transferred to a single vial, served as a comparison for the solitary 
context and also provided a comparison to the collective context of the group treatment. 
Selection protocol: For the group treatment selection only occurred on the 
collective context vials. For this context, I placed 5 mated females into each of 5 vials for 
a total of 25 females per replicate (Fig. 1.2a). I then added 10 larval hosts to each vial, 
creating the wasp-to-host ratio of 1:2. The females were allowed approximately 48 hours 
to lay on the hosts and then each wasp was transferred to a separate vial with only 2 
hosts, maintaining the 1:2 wasp to host ratio (Fig. 1.2b) for the solitary context. The 
wasps were then allowed approximately 48 hours to oviposit in the hosts.  
Fourteen days after the wasps in each treatment were given hosts, I counted the 
number of wasps that had emerged from the host puparia and standardized this count 
against the available resources for each group. I did so by dividing the total number of 
wasps by the original mass (g) of the hosts placed in that collective vial. Because some 
hosts were not parasitized, I then adjusted the standardized count by dividing by the total 
number of hosts that were parasitized, including those from which adult wasps emerged 
and those from which no adults emerged but within which were developing Nasonia 
pupae. This method provided the number of adult wasps per standardized host for each 
collective vial, which I used as the basis for selecting the vial with the largest population 
size in each replicate. I used the vial chosen to create 5 new vials with 5 mated females 
and 10 hosts each to start the next generation. In other words, this experiment used a 
propagule pool as opposed to a migrant pool (Wade 1978), as the former is more likely to 
favor group-level selection. I repeated this process over 5 rounds of selection creating 
Generations 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.  
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1.2a. Full Experimental Design 
          Group Treatment          Organismal Treatment 
Collective Context  Solitary Context    Solitary Context    Collective Context 
 
 
 
1.2b. Transfer of wasps between contexts                              1.2c. Creation of next 
generation 
  
Figure 1.2. Experimental Design. In each section, the group treatment is on the left and 
the organismal treatment on the right. 1.2a) Depiction of the full experimental design, 
shown representing two of the total generations. 1.2b) Detailed representation of the 
horizontal arrows depicting the transfer of contexts shown in 1.2a. 1.2c) Detailed 
representation of the vertical arrows depicting the selection and creation of subsequent 
generations shown in 1.2a.  
 
Generation 1 
Generation 2 
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The protocol for the organismal treatment was identical, with the exception that 
selection only occurred on the solitary context and each replicate started with 5 females 
in the solitary context and these were moved to the collective context (1.2b). The timing 
between these transfers remained the same. After assessing the total offspring for each 
solitary female, I used the same calculations as described above—including host weights 
and the number parasitized—and then chose the brood with the most adults per 
standardized host in each replicate. From this brood I collected 5 mated females to begin 
the next generation of the organismal selection treatment by placing each mated female 
into a separate vial with 2 hosts (Fig. 1.2c).  
Analysis: Because the goal of this experiment was to estimate the overall 
response or lack of response to selection, I used an analysis comparing the number of 
offspring per standardized host in the first generation of the experiment and in the last 
generation of the experiment in A) each treatment: group and organismal, and in B) each 
context: collective and solitary. For these comparisons, I used one-way ANOVAs since 
the observations were approximately normally distributed and did not show significant 
differences in variance. 
I also tested if sex ratios changed during the experiment, again comparing the first 
and last generations. For these analyses I used 2-sample t-tests with the conservative 
assumption of unequal variances in the samples and used a 2-tail test for differences 
above or below the mean. 
To estimate organismal contributions to group phenotypes, I designed this 
experiment to use contextual analysis, a technique from the social sciences (e.g., Boyd 
and Iversen 1979), but also used in biology over the last 20 years (Heisler and Damuth 
  14 
1987; Goodnight et al. 1992; Okasha 2006). Contextual analysis requires knowing the 
organismal contribution to group fitness, which is unavailable for this experiment. This is 
why I added the solitary context to the group treatment to serve as a proxy for organismal 
fitness and relative contribution to the population. However, because of the significant 
differences in the behavior of females when solitary compared with when they were in 
groups, particularly with regard to number of eggs laid and sex ratio of the broods (see 
results section), the solitary context would not have served as a reliable proxy for the 
organismal contributions needed for contextual analysis. As such, I decided that 
contextual analysis would have been inappropriate and removed it from the final analysis. 
 
Results 
Population size: In the collective vials of five wasps within the group treatment, 
there was no statistically significant difference between mean number of offspring per 
host in Generation 0 and mean number of offspring per host in Generation 5 (Table 1.1). 
However, when the same females were later allowed to lay eggs in the solitary context of 
the group treatment, there was a significant increase in mean number of offspring per 
host between Generations 0 and 5 (Table 1.2). In the organismal treatment, there was a 
significant increase in mean number of offspring per host when the females were housed 
individually (Table 1.3). Similar to the group treatment, in the organismal treatment there 
was no significant change between Generation 0 and Generation 5 of the experiment 
when females were housed collectively in groups of five after they were hosted alone  
(Table 1.4). Furthermore, in both selection treatments, females laying in solitary contexts 
produced a mean number of offspring per host that was significantly greater (six fold 
difference) than females allowed to lay collectively in group contexts (Figure 1.3).  
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Table 1.1. ANOVA table for comparison of beginning and ending mean number of 
offspring per host in the group treatment for collective vials containing five females 
SUMMARY       
Groups Vials Sum Mean  SEM   
Gen 0 15 311 20.74 1.82   
Gen 5 15 287 19.12 1.14   
       
ANOVA       
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 19.56 1 19.56 0.567 0.46 4.2  
Within Groups 966.50 28 34.52    
Total 986.10 29     
 
 
Table 1.2. ANOVA table for comparison of beginning and ending mean number of 
offspring per host in the group treatment for females in solitary vials 
SUMMARY      
Groups Vials Sum Mean SEM   
Gen 0 55 7190 131 7.99   
Gen 5 55 8783 160 7.34   
       
ANOVA       
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 23069 1 23069 7.6108 0.007  3.93  
Within Groups 327357 108 3031    
Total 350426 109     
 
 
Table 1.3. ANOVA table for comparison of beginning and ending mean number of 
offspring per host in the organismal treatment for females in solitary vials 
SUMMARY      
Groups Vials Sum Mean  SEM   
Gen 1 12 1586 132 16.4   
Gen 5 12 2265 189 13.75   
       
ANOVA       
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 19236 1 19236 7.00  0.015  4.30 
Within Groups 60488 22 2749    
Total 79724 23     
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Table 1.4. ANOVA table for comparison of beginning and ending mean number of 
offspring per host in the organismal treatment for collective vials containing five females 
SUMMARY      
Groups Vials Sum Mean SEM   
Gen 1 3 85.72 28.57 1.63   
Gen 5 3 114.9 38.30 3.82   
       
ANOVA       
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 141.78 1 141.78 5.48 0.08  7.71  
Within Groups 103.44 4 25.86    
Total 245.22 5     
 
 
                           Group Treatment             Organismal Treatment 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3. Population Size Results. 
Population size represented by mean number of offspring per host for each replicate 
shown in each combination of treatment and context. Symbols/colors represent each 
replicate. Error bars show SEM; any values where error bars are not obvious fell within 
the symbol. 
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Sex ratios: In the group treatment, there was a statistically significant difference 
in the sex ratios of the collective context between Generation 1 and 5, with an increase in 
mean number of males per group (t=2.44, df=22, p=0.02). However, the solitary context 
of the group treatment did not show a significant change in sex ratio (t=0.63, df=104, 
p=0.53), nor did the solitary context of the organismal treatment (t=0.29, df=20, p=0.77), 
or the collective context of the organismal treatment (t=0.49, df=4, p=0.65) (Figure 1.4). 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4. Sex Ratio Results.  
Mean sex ratios for collective and solitary contexts of the group and organismal 
treatments. Error bars show SEM; any values for which error bars are not obvious fell 
within the symbol. 
 
Discussion 
Population size: Under the experimental conditions described above, a collective 
of five female wasps housed together as a group did not respond to selection for 
increased population size, as standardized by number of adults per host. Two hypotheses 
could explain this outcome. 
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Hypothesis 1) The experimental design did not impose sufficient strength or 
duration of selection to elicit an observable increase in population size. 
The populations in this experiment competed via differential 
reproduction/extinction of groups: the largest vial spawned all of the populations in the 
next generation, while the smaller four vials did not produce new groups at all. This 
experiment used propagule pools in the creation of subsequent generations rather than 
migrant pools, a distinction that served to clarify the concept of reproduction at the 
group-level (Wade 1978). A propagule pool is created by randomly collecting a set 
number of adults from a group that is the target of selection and generating a new group 
from each propagule, while a migrant pool is created by first merging the emigrating 
adults from all groups and then collecting from this merged pool to create new groups. 
Propagule pools are particularly effective at selecting upon non-additive genetic effects 
or epistatic effects at the group-level as a result of population structure – such as 
frequencies of interacting phenotypes – because they tend to maintain the population 
structure of each selected group. In contrast, migrant pools reshuffle any population 
structure each generation by first merging all individuals (Wade 1978). Yet, despite these 
conditions that were favorable for selection at the group level, there was no response in 
population size. 
In further consideration of hypothesis 1, the results observed in this experiment 
are reminiscent of at least two other studies in which no response was observed. 
Baer et al. (2000), studying Heterandria formosa, a live-bearing fish, reported no 
response after six rounds of selection and concluded: 
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this result suggests that extinction, either random or due to selection on 
population-level traits, may be unlikely to produce an evolutionary 
response in the demographic properties of populations unless the 
populations involved are quite small for a number of generations and/or 
migration among surviving populations is low. (Baer et al. 2000:177)  
 
However, Baer et al. intentionally used a migrant pool design to decrease inbreeding, 
which consequently removed any effect that population structure might have had on the 
heritability of the trait in question. Their design also imposed weaker selection than other 
group-level selection experiments by selecting on three of five groups each generation, 
leaving the possibility that their experimental design did not provide enough time for this 
treatment – under the established conditions of strength and duration of selection – to 
exhibit a response. 
Bashey and Lively (2009), studied the endopathic nematode Steinernema 
carpocapsae, and reported a response to selection at the group level in one of three 
source populations, while the other two showed no response. Yet, the three populations 
were derived from a single stock and differed in only two ways: 1) when they were 
separated from the stock population, and 2) how many passages they had undergone since 
separation. This suggests that the amount of genetic variation present in the population at 
the initiation of each experiment had an important influence on whether the population 
responded to the selection pressure imposed (Bashey and Lively, 2009).  
It is also worth noting that Lewontin (1970) suggested that group-level traits 
would evolve more slowly than traits at the organismal-level or below because of the 
greater generation time of group-level traits. However, with respect to the results of my 
experiment, despite the lack of a response in the number of offspring per host at the 
group-level, there was a response in the sex ratio of the group-level and a change in the 
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number of offspring per host of the solitary females in the group treatment. This suggests 
that the strength and duration of selection were sufficient to see a response in both the 
group and organismal treatments, which is further supported by the use of a propagule 
pool and the initiation of the experiment with the genetically diverse ASURx population. 
Hypothesis 2) Five female Nasonia housed collectively do not act as a  “group”  
with respect to selection on population size.  
An  analysis  of  hypothesis  2  depends  upon  the  definition  of  “group.”  However,  
theoreticians, philosophers, and experimentalists have varied greatly in how they 
conceive  of  a  “group,”  and  few  have  provided  explicit  definitions  for  their  differing  
conceptions (Table 1.5). For example, as shown by column 2 of Table 1.5, only three of 
the 16 papers reported provided an explicit definition for the concept of a “group.”  Note  
that for the experimental studies, merely describing the experimental design of the groups 
used did not count as providing an explicit definition of group, as the experimental design 
is merely an operationalization of a definition rather than an explicit definition in and of 
itself.  
Hull (1980) recognized a related problem concerning definitions in the group 
selection controversy: 
From the beginning of the controversy over group selection, two quite 
different sorts of "groups" seem to have been intended: highly organized 
groups exhibiting group characteristics and organisms that happen to be 
located in close proximity to each other. (Hull 1980:312) 
 
Of these two types, Hull thought that too many arguments focused on the later, when they 
should have focused on the former. However, some researchers have attempted to define 
such  “group  characteristics”  based  upon  particular  kinds  of  interactions  among  group  
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members. For instance, Sober and Wilson (1998:92) wrote:  “a group is defined as a set of 
individuals  that  influence  each  other’s  fitness  with  respect  to  a  certain  trait  but  not  the  
fitness of those outside the group.”  In  other  words,  building  upon  Wilson’s  (1975)  “trait  
group”  model,  Sober  and  Wilson  (1998)  conceive of a group as a collection of organisms 
that engage in particular kinds of fitness-relevant-interactions. Colum 3 of Table 1.5 
summarizes instances where a definition depends upon interactions among organisms. 
For instance, some of the experiments likely involved interaction among organisms 
within groups, but these interactions were not quantified or discussed in relation to the 
study’s  questions. 
 
Source Definition 
implicit or 
explicit? 
Interaction 
based? 
Spatially 
isolated? 
Referenced only as 
evolutionary unit 
Wynne-Edwards 1962 No Yes Yes No 
Maynard Smith 1964 No Yes Yes No 
Lack 1966 No No Yes No 
Williams 1966 No No Yes No 
Lewontin 1970 No No Uncertain* Yes 
Wilson 1975 Yes Yes No No 
Maynard Smith 1976 No Yes Yes No 
Wade 1976 No Yes Yes No 
Goodnight 1985 No No Yes No 
Heisler and Damuth 1988 No Yes/No+ 
(MLS1/MLS2) 
Yes/No+ 
(MLS1/MLS2) 
Yes 
Sober and Wilson 1998 Yes Yes No No 
Baer et al 2000 No No Yes No 
Okasha 2006 No No No Yes 
Pigliucci and Kaplan 2006 No No Uncertain* Yes 
West et al 2006 Yes Yes Yes No 
Bashey and Lively 2009 No No Yes No 
Table 1.5:  Definitions  of  “group”  summarizing  the  variety  of  factors  different  sources 
have used to define a group. See discussion for more detail about each column. 
*This source did not provide enough information to determine if spatial isolation is a 
necessary part of the definition provided 
+Heisler and Damuth (1988) intentionally distinguish between two different kinds of 
multilevel selection, here referred to as MLS1 and MLS2 
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Other researchers have emphasized some degree of persistence and isolation as 
essential to a concept of group for group-level selection. For instance, Maynard Smith 
(1964) used groups in his well-known haystack model that persisted separately for 
multiple generations so that competing alleles would become fixed in different groups. 
Column 4 of Table 1.5 shows which sources also rely upon spatial isolation to define 
“group.”    For  experimental  studies,  this  included  experimental  designs  with  separated  
groups. 
Finally, some researchers have forgone defining the group itself, and instead 
focused exclusively on the types of features necessary for a group to serve as an 
evolutionary unit in the same way that organisms or other levels of organization might. 
For instance, in a quote reminiscent of Lewontin (1970), Pigliucci and Kaplan (2006:67) 
wrote: 
when  selection  ‘sees’  features  of  a  group  in  a  way  that  makes  the  features 
of the individual organism that make up the group invisible to the physical 
processes involved, it makes sense to think in terms of the group being 
selected. 
 
This is to say that Pigliucci and Kaplan view a group, for the study of group-level 
selection, as defined by traits that—in  Brandon’s  (1982,  1990)  language—“screen  off”  
selection at the level of the group. Column 5 of Table 1.5 denotes sources that were not 
exclusively addressing group-level selection, and mention the level of the group as one of 
multiple possible levels at which selection might act. Perhaps because of this, none of 
them  provide  definitions  of  “group”  and  seem  instead  focused  on  describing  the  features  
necessary for any level of organization to serve as a level at which selection might act. 
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Previous studies of Nasonia provide evidence suggesting the potential for a 
group-level trait such as “interaction among individuals,” that would fit with some of 
these definitions. For instance, Burton-Chellew et al. (2008) proposed that in Nasonia 
females,  decisions  regarding  their  broods’  sex  ratios  are  largely  mediated  by  the  number  
of eggs already in a host, rather than through the physical presence of other females. 
Studies also show that different strains of N. vitripennis have heritable differences in the 
degree to which females adjust the sex ratio of their broods (Parker and Orzack 1985; 
Orzack et al. 1991), and females also facultativly adjust the size of their brood based on 
the number of times a host has already been parasitized (Burton-Chellew et al. 2008). 
In my experiment, the wasps in the solitary contexts – regardless of selection 
treatment – produced significantly more offspring than wasps in the collective contexts. 
This suggests that the wasps in collectives were interacting in fitness relevant ways, such 
as through interference or competition (e.g., as in groups of chickens, Muir 1996), or 
females laid fewer eggs in the presence of other females since females preferentially lay 
eggs on unparasatized hosts (Ivens et al. 2009). The latter is likely a mechanism for 
conserving eggs for a possible future encounter with a host when fewer females are 
present. Either of these behaviors could account for fitness relevant interactions, which 
would  make  the  collectives  of  five  wasps  a  “group”  sensu Sober and Wilson (1998). 
However, because the collectives only existed for a single generation, they did not 
provide  the  persistence  required  to  fit  Maynard  Smith’s concept  of  “group” for group-
level selection. Finally, because the number of offspring per host changed in the solitary 
context of the group treatment when the group-level trait did not, some might argue that 
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the collectives in this experiment were not groups sensu Pigliucci and Kaplan (2006) 
because there was no obvious trait at the group-level that screened off selection. 
Sex ratios: In this experiment, N. vitripennis females responded directly or 
indirectly to the presence of other females and altered the sex ratios of their broods, an 
outcome expected based on previous studies (Warren 1980; Parker and Orzack 1985; 
Orzack et al. 1991; Burton-Chellew et al. 2008; Grillenberger et al. 2008). This result 
reinforces the earlier conclusion that the experimental design was appropriate for eliciting 
selection on some traits. When selected for increased number of offspring per host in a 
solitary context, the number of offspring per host increased, supporting the conclusion 
that even in laboratory strains there remains heritable variation in fecundity (Parker and 
Orzack 1985; Orzack et al. 1991). The proportion of males in each group also increased 
significantly in the solitary contexts of both the organismal selection and group selection 
treatments. 
In addition to the changes in sex ratio in response to selection on offspring per 
host, this experiment suggests that when determining the sex ratio for their eggs, female 
wasps respond to the presence or absence of other females in a way that is at least 
partially contingent upon previous experience. N. vitripennis strains vary in their ability 
to respond to the presence of other females (Parker and Orzack 1985; Orzack et al. 1991), 
and these results suggest that N. vitripennis females experience a priming effect when 
determining how many eggs to oviposit on a particular host. In other words, it appears 
that females lay broods with more males when initially exposed to other females or to the 
presence of already-parasitized hosts—in this case, the transition from collective context 
to solitary context—while females lay broods with fewer males when previously exposed 
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to a solitary context and unparasitized hosts, such as the transition from the solitary 
context to the collective context. 
Though my experiment shows significant differences in the aggregate sex ratios 
of the same wasps when laying in solitary and group contexts, the experiment does not 
provide direct evidence for how individual females are changing the sex ratio of their 
broods, since this study does not track the contribution of individual wasps to the group 
sex ratio, which is important for understanding the behavior of individual wasps (Orzack 
et al. 1991). 
This observation might also provide an additional explanation for the lack of a 
response to selection at the group level, as it suggests that the wasps have behavioral 
adaptations that actively discourage forming integrated groups. This makes sense from 
the perspective of the individual female: in solitary contexts the female has greater access 
to resources for her offspring and will lay more females as expected from sex ratio theory 
(Hamilton 1967). However, when in the presence of other females, or when parasitizing 
patches that have already been parasitized by other females, a female wasp will lay a 
brood with a male-biased sex ratio, and will lay fewer eggs so as to conserve her 
investment for the possibility of finding another unparasitized patch. This would explain 
higher broods per host in both solitary contexts, the possible priming effect seen on the 
brood sex ratios, and would place selection pressure on mated females to avoid the 
presence of other females whenever possible. 
 
Conclusion 
 
I conducted a selection experiment with the parasitoid wasp Nasonia to test if five 
females housed in a single vial would respond to selection for increased population size. 
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Following similar designs in other studies of group-level selection (e.g., Wade 1976, 
1977),  the  target  of  selection  was  the  “group-level”  collective  of five wasps. I predicted 
that there would be a response to selection in the form of an increase in mean population 
size, but no such increase was observed in the group treatment.  
I also predicted that the mean sex ratios would show an increase in number of 
males relative to females as part of the overall response to selection. In this respect, the 
results of the experiment did match with predictions, as the sex ratio of the group 
treatment did change. This result is consistent with previous research, and suggests that 
there was sufficient time and strength of selection to elicit a response under the 
conditions of this experiment. The results of this experiment also suggest that female 
Nasonia adjust the sex ratio of their broods in ways that partially depend upon conditions 
that they have experienced previously: females increase the relative proportion of males 
in future broods after they have encountered other females, or decrease the proportion of 
males in future broods after initially encountering no other females.  
In discussing the results of this experiment, I alluded to the challenge of designing 
a multilevel selection experiment that is capable of comparing group and organismal 
selection pressures, particularly when using a parasitic system because of the additional 
challenge of standardizing available resources. Nonetheless, such experiments will be 
essential if we hope to continue testing conditions under which selection at levels other 
than the organism might operate. 
However, the greater challenge in interpreting the results of this experiment 
became apparent as I considered the extent to which any interpretation was predicated 
upon  how  one  conceives  of  a  “group.”  That  is,  by  some  definitions  of  “group”  this  
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experiment was an example of group-level selection that failed to result in a response to 
the  target  of  selection,  while  by  other  definitions  of  “group”  this  experiment  failed  to  
include group-level selection at all. That such varied interpretations arise from different 
concepts of a group suggests the importance of understanding the history of conceptual 
change in the debates about group-level selection and for science in general. This 
conclusion also demonstrates the importance of experimentalists describing in detail the 
concept upon which their experimental designs and interpretations rest because, as 
Okasha wrote:  
Obviously, empirical data is crucial for resolving the levels-of-selection 
question, as for all scientific questions; but conceptual clarity is a 
prerequisite too. Unless we can agree on what it means for there to be 
selection  at  a  given  hierarchical  level…  then  there  is  little  prospect  of  
empirical resolution, however much data we collect. (Okasha 2006:2) 
 
Future experiments designed to select upon traits at the group-level, including 
those that elicit a response and those that do not, will aid our understanding of the 
conditions under which groups of organisms will or will not respond to selection at the 
group-level. Understanding these conditions for group-level selection will then aid in our 
broader understanding of how selection acts across multiple levels of biological 
organization. 
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CHAPTER 2 
WHY ARE WE STILL ARGUING ABOUT GROUP SELECTION? 
Abstract 
 
During the 1960s, the long-standing idea that particular traits or behaviors could 
be  explained  by  natural  selection  acting  on  traits  that  persisted  “for  the  good  of  the  
group”  prompted  a  series  of  debates  about  group-level selection and the plausibility of 
the idea that natural selection could act at or across multiple levels of biological 
organization. Even today this topic remains a contentious one, despite the fact that many 
researchers consider the debate as having already been settled. In 1983, D.S. Wilson 
reviewed the history of the group selection controversy, highlighting the ways that the 
debates had changed since the 1960s, and identified new evidence and existing conflicts 
related to the conceptual, empirical, and methodological aspects of these debates. By 
comparing the current literature on multilevel selection with the research that Wilson 
(1983) described, I summarize how the group selection controversy has and has not 
changed over the past 50 years. Major changes include the addition of new conceptual 
models and new empirical evidence, while the ways in which the current controversy 
remains largely unchanged are particularly related to methodological disputes. Finally, I 
argue  that  the  history  of  “the”  group  selection  controversy  is  best  understood not as a 
single debate, as it is often presented, but as a series of distinct, though interrelated, 
debates within and across time periods. By understanding the history in this way, it 
becomes clear why some researchers  have  concluded  that  “the  group  selection  debate”  
ended at various times, while other investigators continue arguing about the subject 
today. 
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Introduction 
 
During the 1960s, the long-standing notion that particular characters or behaviors 
could  be  explained  by  natural  selection  acting  on  traits  that  persisted  “for  the  good  of  the  
group”  prompted  a  series  of  debates  about  group-level selection and the plausibility of 
the idea that natural selection could act at or across multiple levels of biological 
organization. For some researchers this topic remains contentious, yet other researchers 
consider the controversy as settled even while disagreeing about when and how this 
resolution occurred (Hamilton and Dimond 2012). Such disagreement about the current 
status of group selection thinking raises two important questions: Why are some 
researchers still arguing about the effectiveness of natural selection acting at one or more 
levels of biological organization? And why do researchers vary in their perception of 
whether and when a resolution to this controversy occurred? 
To answer these questions, and simultaneously provide a review of the current 
state of multilevel selection, I use an approach similar  to  the  “keyword”  method  used  by  
Helmreich and Roosth (2010) and Keller and Lloyd (1992). In effect, this method follows 
the history of key ideas as a means of understanding the current controversy and 
theoretical framing. As Keller and Lloyd described: 
Attending to the multiple meanings of key terms provides a lens through 
which it is possible not only to understand better what is at issue in 
particular scientific debates but also to scrutinize the very structure of the 
arguments under debate. (Keller and Lloyd 1992:4) 
 
To do so, I first identify a collection of core ideas at stake in the debates about 
group-level selection using David Sloan Wilson’s (1983) review of the group-selection 
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controversy, and then compare these ideas with their current status in the literature on 
group and multilevel selection. My analysis illustrates how history can afford a way to 
understand the persistence of the controversy, and the failure to reach closure, by 
revealing how variation in the concepts, including the concept of a “group,” influenced 
the interpretation of models, experimental design, and empirical data. 
Wilson (1983) reviewed the then-current controversy intending to bring to light 
the complexity of the debates about group selection thinking and to summarize the most 
recent empirical and theoretical evidence in support of selection acting at the group-level. 
He did so with the aim of settling the ongoing disputes by providing a common historical 
and conceptual foundation for future work to build upon so that it would not be burdened 
by outdated criticisms. Yet, the controversy over natural selection operating at one or 
more levels of biological organization continues (e.g., Wild et al. 2009; Wade et al. 2010; 
Wild et al. 2010; Nowak et al. 2010; Abbot et al. 2011; Nowak et al. 2011). 
I will show how the controversy over group-level selection is best understood 
through  a  lens  of  conceptual  change.  My  thesis  is  that  the  history  of  “the”  group  selection  
controversy is best described not as a single debate, as it is often presented, but as a series 
of distinct, though often interrelated, debates driven by differences in what researchers 
have  taken  to  be  “the”  group  selection  problem  from  the  conceptual  or  theoretical  
standpoint. Further adding to the boundaries between these multiple debates, researchers 
have used varying forms of evidence in their explanations, often placing differing 
weights on the kinds of evidence used. By understanding the history in this way, it 
becomes clear why different researchers have concluded that the group selection debate 
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ended at different times, as well as why some researchers continue to argue about the 
effectiveness of natural selection at multiple levels of biological organization. 
In exploring this thesis and the role of conceptual change throughout the sections 
of this chapter, I first provide a grounding in the controversies surrounding group 
selection in 1983  by  reviewing  Wilson’s  paper. I identify three broad categories – 
conceptual, empirical, and methodological – that organize how Wilson described the 
debates and how they changed during the history that he summarized. Then I use 
Wilson’s (1983) review as a foundation to compare and analyze how the points Wilson 
addressed have or have not changed since the early 1980s, revealing the extent to which 
conceptual change has occurred by tracking the same organizational categories I 
identified in Wilson’s  analysis. Finally, I will provide my own historical analysis that 
demonstrates  the  usefulness  of  understanding  “the  group  selection  debate”  as  a  series  of  
interrelated debates often motivated by the questions and methods that researchers used 
that have influenced models, experimental design, and the interpretation of data. 
 
Group Selection Before 1983  
 
Wilson  (1983)  sought  to  both  frame  and  settle  “the  group  selection  controversy,”  
which by that point had been ongoing for more than 20 years. While natural selection was 
often seen as effective at multiple levels of biological organization before the 1960s (e.g., 
see Williams 1996, Collins 1986, Wilson and Wilson 2007), researchers and theoreticians 
during the 1960s raised arguments against many of the assumptions associated with 
group selection reasoning (e.g., Maynard Smith 1964, Williams 1966, Lack 1966; see 
Borrello 2010 for a review). By the late 1960s and early 1970s, biologists in general 
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accepted the argument that natural selection was not expected to be effective at the level 
of the group and higher. Wilson (1983) succinctly summarized the tenor of these times: 
“group  selection  rivaled  Lamarkianism  as  the  most  thoroughly  repudiated  idea  in  
evolutionary  biology”  (Wilson  1983:159).  Later  still,  many  would  continue  to  think  of  
group  selection  as  a  “solecism  which  would  cause  today’s  biology  undergraduates to 
wince”  (Dawkins,  2000:  para.  3).   
Despite this reputation, some continued working on the theoretical and empirical 
possibility of selection at the group level during the 1970s. For instance, Wade (1978) 
reviewed various group selection models from this time. One  of  Wilson’s  (1983)  major  
arguments was that it was time to move past the previous conclusions that group selection 
lacked  theoretical  and  empirical  merit.  To  this  end,  Wilson’s  article  had  two  sections. 
First, he described the history of the debates, highlighting the nature of previous models, 
especially  their  weaknesses,  while  arguing  that  the  “new  group  selection”  models  that  he  
and others developed during the 1970s did not suffer from the same failings. Second, 
Wilson provided a foundation for future research, explaining the then-current theoretical 
models and empirical evidence and suggesting new areas of research that group selection 
researchers could pursue. 
 In  what  follows,  I  review  the  historical  portion  of  Wilson’s  paper,  particularly  the 
sections that provided the foundation for future research and the conflicts that Wilson 
argued were preventing researchers from moving beyond the controversy related to group 
level selection. I consider the topics that Wilson reviewed as falling into three areas: 1) 
the conceptual content of the debate, 2) the empirical evidence available, and 3) 
methodological disputes. I discuss each of these areas, including the topics within each 
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that Wilson (1983) described. Then I argue that even before the mid-1980s there was 
evidence of multiple interrelated debates about group selection rather than a single 
ongoing debate. 
 
Conceptual content before 1983: new models and the concept of a group 
New conceptual models: During the 1970s a new class of model describing how 
selection could act at the group level entered the group selection discussions: the 
intrademic group selection (IGS) model. Unlike prior group selection models that relied 
upon entire groups competing via differential survival, reproduction, or extinction, IGS 
models focused on the dynamics of organisms interacting within groups in ways that 
caused group-level properties to contribute to organismal-level fitness. In describing 
these models, Wilson (1983) aimed to counter two criticisms of group selection models:  
1) Group selection models could not adequately represent a process by which 
natural selection at the level of the group would lead to a response or group adaptation. 
2) The new—IGS—models might represent a natural process capable of leading 
to a response, but they shared nothing with the group selection models of the 1960s and 
were not representing selection at the group level.  
To counter these claims, it was not enough for Wilson to simply describe the new 
IGS models. Instead, he first provided a review of older group selection models, both 
verbal and mathematical, to show that IGS models shared a theoretical coherence with 
the earlier group selection models. Then he described the application of these new models 
to show that IGS could effectively account for selection at the group level. Here I will 
follow  Wilson’s structure, first summarizing his review of what  he  called  the  “verbal  
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models”  and  “mathematical  models”  and  then  moving  to  a full description of the new 
IGS models.  
Verbal models: Despite the fact that many of the models of group-level selection 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s focused on mathematical formulations of nature, 
Wilson  reminded  readers  that  these  mathematical  models  were  themselves  “attempts  to  
clarify  a  more  nebulous,  preexisting  verbal  idea”  (Wilson  1983,  160).  These  earlier  
verbal models,  Wilson  argued,  focused  on  a  more  “intuitive”  sense  of  how  adaptation  
generally worked, and these ideas were often influenced by societal attitudes rather than a 
deep understanding of the biology. In describing the verbal models of group selection, 
Wilson agreed with Williams (1966) regarding the role of social influences on how we 
might conceive of group-level selection and group-level adaptation: 
The conflicting perspectives of individual selfishness vs subservience to 
others are so pervasive among humans that it is hardly surprising that both 
found their way into evolutionary thinking and were originally stated as 
axioms. Thus individuals, groups of individuals, species, and entire 
ecosystems were all endowed with purposeful, organized behavior. 
(Wilson 1983:161) 
 
In other words, because of the extensive cooperation that we see in human societies, it 
seems  intuitive  at  some  level  to  think  about  some  traits  as  existing  “for  the  good  of  the  
group”  even  in  non-human species. This reasoning, by analogy, led to explanations of 
many apparently group-level traits as group-level adaptations.  
But  opponents  of  this  “for  the  good  of  the  group”  view  identified  a  key  flaw  in  
this  line  of  reasoning.  Wilson  again  pointed  to  Williams’s  (1966)  description  of  the  
problem with group level thinking when applied to evolutionary biology:  
If natural selection favors individuals that leave the most offspring, then 
individuals that benefit themselves at the expense of others should be very 
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fit indeed. Individuals that benefit others, presumably at some expense to 
themselves, would be selected against as surely as if they had bad eyes or 
faulty teeth. (Wilson 1983, 162) 
 
This dilemma, the problem of how altruistic traits and seemingly maladaptive behaviors 
could persist in populations, became one major focus for the group selection discussions 
of the 1960s and 1970s. How can one explain apparently maladaptive behaviors while 
maintaining the framework of natural selection, which was understood to be an inherently 
selfish process? Explaining this dilemma, Wilson argued, was the goal of the verbal 
models of group selection. However, as I suggested in chapter 1 and discuss in more 
detail below, few of these verbal formulations provided detailed definitions for the 
concept of the “group”  upon  which  selection  was  supposed  to  act.  Perhaps  partly  in  
response to these nebulous formulations, the mathematical tradition took to explaining 
the same problems with more clarity and precision than the verbal models. 
Mathematical  models:  In  Wilson’s  (1983)  account,  three  researchers’  work,  which  
I discuss below, became the foundation for different pathways to mathematically 
addressing the topic of group selection prior to 1972: Sewall Wright, Vero Copner 
Wynne-Edwards, and John Maynard Smith. 
According  to  Wilson,  “since  the  primary  objection  to  the  evolution  of  group-level 
adaptations was stated in mathematical terms, a mathematical answer was required; most 
people  looked  to  the  work  of  Sewall  Wright”  (1983:163).  For  Wilson,  Wright’s  (1945)  
work provided a clear example of an early mathematical formulation of both the problem 
of explaining individually disadvantageous traits and the potential solution provided by 
between-group  selection.  The  core  of  Wright’s  (1945)  model  was  a  single  locus  system 
with two alternative alleles. One of these alleles coded for a socially beneficial character 
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that was deleterious to an individual organism. Selection against organisms carrying this 
allele would either be (1-s) for heterozygotes carrying a single copy of the allele or (1-2s) 
for  homozygotes  carrying  two  copies  of  the  allele,  where  “s”  equals  the  selection  
coefficient. However, the benefit to the entire group would increase the fitness of all 
genotypes within the group by 1 plus the benefit multiplied by the number of beneficial 
alleles present. Thus, whenever the benefit to the group outweighed the cost to the 
organisms, the allele should encourage group growth, but because the allele is always 
selected against at the organismal-level, selection should tend to decrease the allele in the 
global population. Wright reasoned, however, that if these beneficial alleles were 
distributed across many populations in which the frequency of these alleles varied, then 
groups with the highest frequency of the beneficial allele would grow most quickly and 
create a larger number of new colonizing groups than other populations resulting in a 
form of between-group selection caused by differential growth and reproduction of the 
populations. Wilson (1983) pointed to Wright as concluding,  “It  is  indeed  difficult  to  see  
how socially advantageous but individually disadvantageous mutations can be fixed 
without  some  form  of  intergroup  selection”  (Wright  1945:417). Though, as I discuss at 
the end of this section, Wright himself did not seem to consider this process to be true 
“group  selection.” 
Although V.C. Wynne-Edwards did not formulate a mathematical model of group 
selection, Wilson (1983) reasoned that so many mathematical models had been 
constructed based on Wynne-Edwards’s  (1962) verbal formulation that it was appropriate 
to describe Wynne-Edwards’s  work  as  a  distinct  source  of  mathematical  models.  Though  
Wilson (1983) seemed to criticize Wynne-Edwards (1962) for only considering 
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populations of animals rather than other kinds of groups, this is because Wynne-
Edwards’s  work was  concerned  with  answering  what  he  called  “the  population  problem:”  
the fact that most populations of animals have the capacity to exhaust their available 
resources, and yet do not. He proposed that populations regulate their numbers through a 
series  of  “homeostatic  mechanisms”  including  epideictic  displays  and  other  behaviors  
that would provide a visual indicator to group members of how large the population was, 
as well as dominance behaviors such as territoriality that would limit access to potential 
mates and thus limit population growth. A core component of his argument was that these 
mechanisms persist because of differential extinction of the groups in which the 
mechanisms fail, resulting in a form of selection at the group level for the maintenance of 
these homeostatic mechanisms (see also: Wynne-Edwards 1963, 1985, 1993). As Wilson 
(1983) noted, a large number of the mathematical group selection models of the time bore 
“the  stamp  of  Wynne-Edwards’s  ideas”  (1983:166),  and  Wilson  (1983)  cited  at  least  10  
such models. Most of these models consist of multiple groups and a fixed number of 
possible habitats that can be occupied by a single group. Within each group, organismal 
behavior is modeled as controlled by a single-locus, with one allele serving as a “selfish” 
variant that ultimately increases to fixation. At the group-level, each group faces a 
probability of extinction that is related to the frequency of the selfish allele. Much of the 
variation in these models derives from the nature of this relationship between a selfish 
allele and the probability of group extinction. If the group occupying a particular habitat 
becomes extinct, then the site becomes available for colonization by other groups. Thus, 
following Wynne-Edwards’s  (1962)  argument,  group  selection  in  these  models  is  based  
on differential extinction.  
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In response to Wynne-Edwards’s  (1962) book, John Maynard Smith (1964) 
distinguished the group selection that Wynne-Edwards  advocated  and  W.D.  Hamilton’s  
(1964) then-recently published concept of inclusive fitness. In an interview many years 
later, Maynard Smith recalled that he met with others, including David Lack, after 
reading Wynne-Edwards  (1962)  and  decided  that  Hamilton’s  idea  should  be  renamed  
“kin  selection”  to  clearly  distinguish  it  from  Wynne-Edwards’s  “group  selection”  
(Maynard Smith 1997). Maynard Smith (1964) was the first to use this new wording in 
print when he presented a model to demonstrate why kin selection was a valid 
explanation for seemingly maladaptive behaviors while group selection was not. 
Maynard  Smith’s  model—commonly called the haystack model—consisted of a 
population of mice living in haystacks in which a single Mendelian locus controls 
behavior.  Mice  with  the  dominant  “A”  allele  are  “aggressive”  and  continue  to  consume  
resources and reproduce even in populations with high densities, while mice homozygous 
for  the  “timid”  “a”  allele do not over-exploit resources and reproduce less as resources 
become scarce. Because of this, Maynard Smith argued, within any single group 
eventually  the  “A”  allele  will  become fixed.  However,  at  the  population  level,  the  “a”  
allele is favored because it leads to greater group persistence. 
The model is initiated with a panmictic population containing an equal proportion 
of both alleles and then mated females disperse to found new colonies in separate 
haystacks. Each colony is then allowed to grow over a number of generations sufficient 
for  the  dominant  “A”  allele  to  reach  fixation  in  any  groups  in  which  it is present. Finally, 
the offspring of all groups migrate back to the general panmictic population for another 
round of mating before starting again. Because of this, Maynard Smith (1964) argued, 
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any  group  that  the  dominant  “A”  allele  entered  would  ultimately  become  fixed  for  the  
allele, and so selection for the organismal level selfishness would be stronger than the 
selection for the group-level benefits of  the  “a”  allele  except  under  rare  conditions,  such  
as very low levels of interbreeding between colonies. But as I will discuss later, Wynne-
Edwards (1964) disagreed about the assumptions of this model and argued that when 
using biologically realistic assumptions the model results in group selection acting to 
preserve those groups that conserve resources. Notice  also  that  Maynard  Smith’s  model  
represents a migrant pool while Wynne-Edwards’s  model  represents  a  propagule  pool,  a 
concept that Wade (1978) articulated to counter some of the confusion regarding how to 
represent group reproduction. 
IGS models: Wilson (1983) argued that by comparing the similarities among 
these three distinct versions of mathematical group selection models, the continuity 
between them  and  the  “new”  IGS  models  developed  during  the  1970s  becomes  clear.  
Counting his own work, Wilson cited at least five different sources as having generated 
versions of intrademic group selection models: Price (1970, 1972), Matessi and Jayakar 
(1973, 1976), Charnov and Krebs (1975), Wilson (1975), and Cohen and Eshel (1976). 
However,  it’s  not  immediately  clear  that  all  of  these  were  created  to  serve  as  intrademic  
models (e.g., Price 1970, 1972). Nonetheless, Wilson (1983) argued that while many of 
the specific details in these models varied, they were all built around the same core 
assumptions that allowed the models to work without falling to the criticisms leveled 
against the older formulations of group selection models. 
While many the earlier group selection models were intended to represent 
persistent groups, the groups in intrademic selection models did not necessarily remain 
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cohesive over time. Instead, the IGS models start with a global population of organisms 
that then subdivides into local demes. While this subdivision does not alter the global 
allele frequency of the trait in question, it does create the potential that the allele 
frequencies within each group vary from the allele frequencies within the global 
population. Depending upon the details of the specific model, this formation of demes 
could be random or non-random, affecting the degree of variation between groups 
accordingly. After local demes are formed, selection then works within the demes until 
the organisms within each deme finally disperse back into the global population. 
The ephemeral nature of these groups prompted some to argue that they were not 
really groups at all, but Wilson (1983) disagreed and argued that the IGS models shared a 
great deal of continuity with the more traditional group selection models. As Wilson 
correctly showed, the core of these intrademic models is simply a generalized version of 
Maynard  Smith’s  haystack  model,  allowing  for  a relaxation of some assumptions and 
thus more variation than the original. Wilson (1983) also noted that the intrademic 
models are generally  consistent  with  Wright’s  work  in  which  the  fitness  of  an  organism  
partly depends upon the group context. Indeed, Wilson argued that the IGS models share 
common features with all of the prior group selection models that he described, including 
the fact that within local groups the group-beneficial allele would be selected against, but 
that between the local demes, groups with the highest frequency of the group-beneficial 
allele would be selected. For an excellent comparison between the traditional and 
intrademic group selection models, see Wade’s (1978) review. But as Wilson concluded, 
“no one familiar with the history of the subject can doubt that IGS models fall squarely 
within  the  group  selection  tradition”  (Wilson  1983:170). 
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The concept of a group: As mentioned above, Wilson (1983) suggested that the 
term  “group”  was  being  used  in  a  variety  of  ways  within  debates  about group-level 
selection, particularly since some did not consider the IGS models to be modeling true 
groups, and Table 5 from chapter 1 further illustrates this point. For instance, some 
models—both verbal and mathematical—defined a “group”  as  necessarily persisting over 
an extended period of time in order for group-level selection to function. Wilson (1983) 
cited Wynne-Edwards (1962) and Maynard Smith (1964) as defining their groups as 
persistent  entities:  Maynard  Smith’s  multi-generational groups needed to persist long 
enough for the dominant allele to drive the alternative altruistic allele extinct, while 
Wynne-Edwards’s  groups  required  a  degree  of  persistence  sufficient  to  allow  for  
differential extinction, so that ephemeral groups would likely be selected against.  
However, Wilson (1983) argued, requirements of persistence need not necessarily 
be inherent to the definition of selection at any level, as illustrated by the fact that many 
mathematical models of natural selection in general do not even consider duration. Other 
definitions required a degree of separation to identify groups, but the IGS models work 
equally well with discrete groups and neighborhoods—spatially overlapping groups in 
which a single organism can be part of multiple groups—and IGS models also work with 
groups formed by behavioral segregation rather than spatial separation. Thus, many of the 
IGS  models  work  without  the  assumptions  that  Maynard  Smith’s  haystack  model 
required, such as fixation of each allele within groups between bouts of dispersion. In 
other words, Wilson argued that overly  strict  definitions  of  “group”  limited  the  feasibility  
and applicability of group-level selection models. I should note here, as I describe in 
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more detail below, that Wynne-Edwards (1964) also disagreed with the degree of 
persistence  required  by  Maynard  Smith’s  (1964)  haystack  model.   
Yet, in addition to the degree of persistence that Wilson (1983) highlighted 
regarding  differences  in  the  definition  of  “group,”  even  during  the  1980s  there  were  other 
differences in definitions. As I showed with Table 5 in chapter 1, there were also 
differences in whether groups were defined by a particular degree of spatial isolation, or 
whether fitness relevant interactions – such as those used in IGS models – were 
necessary. For example, Maynard Smith (1976) admitted that his (1964) description of 
group selection had failed to emphasize particular important points, such as group 
extinction. Nonetheless, he remained adamant that: 
For group selection, the division into groups which are partially isolated 
from one another is an essential feature. If group selection is to be 
responsible  for  the  establishment  of  an  “altruistic”  gene,  the  groups  must  
be small, or must from time to time be re-established by a few founders. 
This is because in a large group there is no way in which a new "altruistic" 
gene  can  be  established.  … 
 
What I should have said in my 1964 paper, but did not, is that the 
extinction of some groups and the "reproduction" of others are essential 
features of evolution by group selection. If groups are the units of 
selection, then they must have the properties of variation, multiplication, 
and heredity required if natural selection is to operate on them. (Maynard 
Smith 1976:279) 
 
Notice that Maynard Smith continued to define groups based upon a measure of spatial 
isolation, as well as a degree of persistence such that it made sense to think of them as 
capable  of  going  extinct.  This  was  in  contrast  with  Wilson’s  (1983)  view  of  groups,  
which – like the other IGS models – were not spatially isolated at all, and were largely 
ephemeral except for key fitness relevant interactions. 
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As I discuss below, many of these conflicting definitions persist in current 
discussions of multilevel selection. 
 
Empirical evidence before 1983: experimental studies of group selection 
 
In addition to the various theoretical models supporting the idea that selection 
could occur at the group-level, Wilson (1983) also cited the growing body of 
experimental studies demonstrating evolutionary responses to group-level selection in 
laboratory settings (e.g., Wade 1976, 1977, 1979, 1982; Craig 1982; McCauley and Wade 
1980,  Wade  and  McCauley  1980).  Wilson  highlighted  Wade’s  experiments with the flour 
beetle Tribolium that demonstrated responses to group-level selection, even when 
selection at the group-level was opposed by selection at the organismal-level. Wilson also 
noted  that  Wade’s  work  provided  evidence  that  some  traits  typically  considered  to  be  the  
result of organismal-level selection can alter as a response to group-level selection. For 
instance,  regarding  Wade’s  results: 
It is interesting to note that the major effect of such extreme group 
selection was to alter rates of cannibalism, which is the very sort of 
behavior that Williams dismissed as "not requiring" group selection! 
(Wilson 1983:183) 
 
Wilson also highlighted the then-recent work in quantitative genetics that was coupled 
with these experiments, which showed that variation between groups can be high even 
when colonized by unrelated individuals: 
This empirical result suggests that the genetics of real populations may be 
more conducive to group selection than has been indicated by single-locus 
models. Although the underlying theory still needs to be developed fully, 
Wade and Craig have suggested that group selection can operate on the 
nonadditive component of genetic variation that is not subject to 
individual selection. (Wilson 1983:184) 
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Wilson (1983) offered these findings as evidence to counter the claims that group 
selection could only work in highly related groups, which was often accompanied by the 
argument that in such cases evolutionary change was the result of kin selection rather 
than true group selection, a point I return to later in this chapter. 
 
Methodological concerns before 1983: local verses global fitness and the 
interchangeability of models 
Local versus global fitness: Wilson (1983) noted that when calculating fitness of 
a single allele, IGS models allow the calculation in two ways: 1) within each group or, 2) 
across all groups as “global fitness”. Wilson argued that calculating allelic fitness with 
this global measure yields the same result as calculating allelic fitness when one ignores 
the deme structure and only calculates the average allelic fitness in the total population. 
These two ways of calculating the global fitness—one including deme structure and the 
other not—Wilson argued, were equally valid for addressing whether a character 
associated with the allele in question would evolve or not. However, Wilson reasoned 
that when a researcher uses the simple calculation of allelic fitness that ignores the deme 
structure, the analysis will fail to capture the effect that the relative fitness of the allele 
within each local group will have on the way that the global population evolves. In other 
words,  if  one’s  goal  is  to  understand  the  selective  pressures  on  the  trait  in  question,  then  
understanding the group structure is important. This is why intrademic models calculate 
relative fitness within each deme rather than at the global level. Not taking this into 
account, Wilson (1983) argued, might lead one to mistakenly attribute the evolution of 
the character in question only to a single level of selection and then conclude that group 
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selection was not present in a case where it actually was. This would also explain why 
some argued that group selection was never necessary to begin with, if they only 
considered evolution of traits estimated at the level of global populations. 
The interchangeability of models: Because of the variety of definitions for the 
term group, and the way that the group can be lost within global population analyses, 
Wilson (1983) argued that many of the population models used in evolutionary biology 
should be recognized as actually modeling the global population, as I described. Within 
the global populations of these models are smaller groups that fit the definitions used by 
IGS models. As others before him, (e.g., Wade 1978), Wilson (1983) argued that the 
sibling groups of traditional kin selection models could be considered a subset of IGS 
models, whereby the siblings of a kin model constitute a special kind of group in which 
all of the members happen to be related. This means, Wilson argued, that group selection 
models and models based on inclusive fitness are simply different methods of analyzing 
the same process: 
Hamilton's [1964] inclusive fitness theory is basically a different method 
of analyzing the same process. It correctly predicts the final outcome but 
does not distinguish clearly between the opposing forces of group and 
individual selection, as they are defined within the group selection 
tradition. (Wilson 1983:177) 
 
This is to say that both kinds of models can predict the same outcome, but inclusive 
fitness models do not distinguish between the forces of group-level and organismal-level 
selection.  
Of course, Wilson acknowledged that  “the  idea  that  kin  selection  is  a  special form 
of group selection grates harshly on many of those who attribute great importance to the 
former  and  none  to  the  latter”  (Wilson 1983:178). For instance, some argued that because 
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the intrademic group selection models could be translated to kin selection and inclusive 
fitness models, they were not really group selection models at all (e.g., Alexander and 
Borgia 1978; Maynard Smith 1964; Treisman 1983). Others seemed offended by the 
calculations used (e.g., Charlesworth 1981; Dawkins 1979; Alexander and Borgia 1978), 
either arguing that calculating relative fitness within groups was an error, or that the 
“differential  productivity  of  groups  caused  by  random  variation  must  be  classified  as  
individual selection, while variation caused by reproduction within groups must be 
classified  as  kin  selection”  (Wilson  1983:179). 
Wilson also argued that while it is fruitless to claim that reproduction within 
groups or degree of relatedness of group members could be used to distinguish kin and 
group selection, this could not justify one set of models as superior to the other:  
The fact that inclusive-fitness models and IGS models are merely different 
ways of analyzing the same population structure does not mean that one 
will ever supplant the other. Both have their separate insights and 
applications. It is imperative, however, always to have the appropriate set 
of definitions in mind and not to use one set to argue against the other 
tradition. (Wilson 1983:179) 
 
Thus, Wilson argued that these approaches can and should be used together so as to 
address a wider range of questions and research topics. 
 
Evidence of multiple debates before 1983 
Though Wilson (1983) provided a single history of the group selection 
controversy, there are hints that it was more than just a linear story even during the 1960s 
and 1970s. For instance, Wilson (1983) and others (e.g., Wade 1978) intentionally 
distinguished between the verbal and the mathematical models of group selection, and 
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although Wilson (1983) argued that they are of the same tradition, he did not disagree 
that the IGS models are different in key respects than those that came before.  
Indeed, even in the three sources of the mathematical tradition that Wilson (1983) 
identified there are suggestions of more than a “single history” for the group-selection 
controversy. For instance, Wade (1976, 1977) clearly grounded his experimental work 
within Wright’s  shifting  balance  theory,  while  others such as Wynne-Edwards (1962) and 
Lack (1966) based their work on discussions of population regulation.  
It is also interesting to note that some researchers, including Wilson (1983), have 
counted  Wright’s  (1945)  work  as  group  selection  despite Wright (1980) having 
complained about his work in 1945 being called group selection. Wright (1980) 
distinguished  between  what  he  called  “intergroup  selection”  and the more commonly 
discussed “group  selection,”  arguing  that  group  selection  for  the  advantage  of  the  group  
to  be  a  “fragile”  process.  Indeed, as Wright noted: 
Maynard Smith, Williams and Dawkins have all discussed group selection 
for group advantage at length, and all have rejected it as of little or no 
evolutionary significance. They seem to have concluded, however, that 
this warrants the conclusion that natural selection is practically wholly 
genic, as implied by Fisher's fundamental theorem. None of them 
discussed group selection for organismic advantage to individuals, the 
dynamic factor in the shifting balance process[,] although this 
process[shifting balance], based on irreversible local peak-shifts[,] is not 
fragile at all, in contrast with the fairly obvious fragility of group selection 
for group advantage, which they considered worthy of extensive 
discussion before rejection. (Wright 1980:841)  
 
In other words,  Wright  (1980)  argued  that  his  “intergroup  selection”  was  different  from  
group selection because the products of selection benefited organisms within groups 
rather than the groups themselves, and Wilson (1983) agreed. Yet others, including 
Williams (1966) and Wade (1978), counted  Wright’s  shifting  balance  as  a  form  of  
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traditional group selection. It is also worth noting here that Wynne-Edwards also referred 
to  his  version  of  group  selection  as  “intergroup  selection”  (e.g.,  Wynne-Edwards 1963). 
Of course, later work in multilevel selection, as I discuss below, used IGS models in a 
way  that  seems  to  fit  with  Wright’s  distinction,  where  the  model  focused  on  group-level 
selection benefiting organisms within each group rather than benefiting the group itself. 
Wilson (1983) also drew attention to the differences between the various forms of 
averaging strategies and arguments about whether group selection or kin selection models 
provide better explanations of the evolutionary processes. In particular, he highlighted the 
fact  that  “group  selection  is  a  fascinating  example  of  how  scientific  questions  arise  from  
unscientific  attitudes  and  of  how  their  development  is  often  haphazard  and  unsystematic”  
(Wilson 1983:159). But by understanding the history as a series of interrelated debates 
rather than a single continuous argument, some of the apparent haphazardness is less 
confusing. After all, if one views the history as continuous when there are actually 
multiple debates occurring, particularly with some of the arguments during the same time 
period actually stemming from different traditions, then it seems rather natural to expect 
that the history would appear haphazard. In the following section I will describe the ways 
that the controversy surrounding group-level selection—particularly the conceptual, 
empirical, and methodological aspects—has and has not changed and, in doing so, the 
presence of multiple distinct debates will become more apparent. 
 
Current Group Selection Debates and Multilevel Selection 
 
 Thirty  years  after  the  publication  of  Wilson’s  (1983)  review,  it  is  striking  to  note  
some of the ways that the topic, and associated controversy, has changed, including the 
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transition to the study of multilevel selection. It is equally important, however, to note 
that some of the aspects Wilson (1983) argued should change are still little different than 
they were thirty years ago, particularly those related to methodical disputes. In the 
sections that follow I discuss first the changes related to the conceptual content, then the 
changes with respect to the empirical evidence.  Finally, I discuss the similarities with 
respect to the empirical evidence, followed by the similarities with respect to method.  
 
Changes related to conceptual content: multilevel selection, major 
evolutionary transitions, and the concept of a group revisited 
Multilevel selection: Of the various changes that have occurred in discussions 
about group-level selection, perhaps the most significant is the transition from framing 
the debate as group selection versus organismal selection to arguments about whether and 
how natural selection might work across a variety of levels of biological organization 
simultaneously. These ideas, now referred to as multilevel selection, become common 
during the middle and late 1980s (e.g., Arnold and Fristrup 1982, Heisler and Damuth 
1987, Damuth and Heisler 1988) although similar views prevailed before the name 
“multilevel  selection”  was  coined  in  1988. 
Lewontin (1970), for example, described three requirements for any entity—
organism, group, species, etc.—to be capable of evolution as a result of natural selection: 
1) variation across the population for a particular trait, 2) heritability for the trait between 
generations, and 3) fitness consequences of the trait. Organisms often exhibit these 
characteristics, Lewontin (1970) argued, but any other level of organization with these 
three  features  should  also  be  considered  a  potential  “unit  of  selection.”  This  included  
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levels of organization ranging from the cell to the organism to the group and the species. 
However, unlike later discussions of multilevel selection, Lewontin (1970) argued that 
those levels of organization above the organism would respond to selection more slowly 
than those of the organism or lower because their generation times would be much 
longer. Thus, Lewontin thought that the response to selection at the lower levels of 
organization would outpace any response to selection at higher levels. Because of this, he 
argued that levels of organization above the organism were likely to be poor units of 
selection in general, though he allowed for the possibility of exceptions, such as the level 
of the species. The later discussions of multilevel selection (e.g., Arnold and Fristrup 
1982) would focus on understanding selection acting simultaneously across levels, 
including cases of selection at multiple levels working in the same direction, rather than 
only considering cases of conflicting selection and generally discounting the possibility 
of selection above the organism. 
Damuth  and  Heisler  (1988)  first  used  the  phrase  “multilevel  selection.”  Citing  
Arnold and Fristrup (1982) as the origin of the basic idea of multilevel selection, Damuth 
and Heisler (1988) explicitly connected the group selection debates with arguments about 
whether selection might work on entire species. They claimed that because both areas of 
research applied the principles of natural selection to levels of organization above the 
organism,  “this  leads  them  both  to  consider  multilevel selection situations, where 
selection  is  occurring  simultaneously  at  more  than  one  level”  (Damuth  and  Heisler  
1988:407, original italics).  
However, Damuth and Heisler (1988) acknowledged that there might be some 
challenges in unifying the study of multilevel selection because of differences in both 
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goals and available data. One challenge they singled out was the fact that researchers 
using the same terminology were sometimes referring to different processes, a point that 
Wilson (1983) also noted. Damuth and Heisler (1988) addressed this by offering a 
distinction  between  two  different  kinds  of  multilevel  selection:  “multilevel selection [1] 
and multilevel selection [2]”  (Damuth  and  Heisler  1988:410,  original  italics  and  
brackets). To better explain these, now often referred to as MLS1 and MLS2 respectively, 
consider their application to group-level selection. 
The MLS1 study of group selection focuses on how organismal fitness is 
influenced by membership in a particular group. This means that fitness is counted at the 
level of the organism, but can be influenced by group-level properties of the group to 
which the organism belongs. The IGS models that Wilson (1983) described are examples 
of MLS1 models. 
The MLS2 study of group selection focuses on the fitness of entire groups, often 
as measured by group reproduction. This means that groups are serving as individuals in 
the sense of Ghiselin (1974) and Hull (1976, 1978). As a consequence of this, for MLS2 
the only traits of interest are those that belong to groups and the only form of 
reproduction that counts is when a group creates new groups. The group selection that 
Wynne-Edwards (1962, 1963) proposed corresponds to MLS2 models. 
Damuth and Heisler (1988) recognized that their division of these two forms of 
multilevel selection was not the first, but they highlighted the fact that all of the previous 
divisions of these two versions of multilevel selection—be they from the group selection 
or species selection discussions—used the distinction to argue that one was correct while 
the other was somehow wrong. Indeed,  Wright’s (1980) distinction between “group 
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selection” and “intergroup  selection”  which  I  discussed  above  is  one  such  example  of  
this. Damuth and Heisler (1988) instead argued that both MLS1 and MLS2 are equally 
valid  because  both  processes  are  present  whenever  multilevel  selection  is  at  work:  “Once  
one has decided to analyze a given situation in terms of multilevel selection processes 
both approaches are legitimate within that context and a choice has to be made depending 
upon  what  questions  are  of  interest”  (1988:411).  In  other  words,  Damuth  and  Heisler  
(1988) argued that the particular questions of the research project should determine 
whether to use MLS1 or MLS2 because the focal unit of the analysis is different between 
the two, with MLS1 focusing on the organism within a larger collective and MLS2 
focusing on the collective or group. 
One strength of the multilevel selection discussions is the push for generality. The 
multilevel selection framework takes the core elements of natural selection and works to 
conceptualize them in a way that will apply across all levels of biological organization. In 
this sense, group selection is still discussed as a particular level of organization, although 
much of the work—both theoretical and empirical—is now applicable to multilevel 
selection in general. As I discuss later, however, there remains confusion in debates about 
group-level selection that would benefit from the MLS1/MLS2 distinction.  
Major evolutionary transitions: Along with the distinction between MLS1 and 
MLS2, the concept of a major evolutionary transition helped to change the ways many 
researchers discussed multilevel selection during the 1990s. Maynard Smith and 
Szathmary (1995; Szathmary and Maynard Smith 1995) proposed that there have been 
eight major evolutionary transitions, each of which involved a change in the way that 
information is stored and transmitted. For example, the transition from entities using 
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RNA as the genetic material to the use of DNA as the genetic material marked a shift in 
the way that entities were transmitting information from one generation to the next. Other 
examples include the transition from unicellular organisms to multicellular organisms—
which required the development of cellular differentiation such that only particular cell 
lines within the organism were involved in reproduction—and the analogous transition 
from solitary organisms to large colonies of organisms with division of labor and non-
reproductive castes. 
The major evolutionary transitions have become an important part of the 
multilevel selection discussions because many of these transitions involve collections of 
entities integrating into a higher-level entity upon which selection acts. Change in 
information transmission is seen in the fact that most of the lower-level entities are no 
longer directly involved in the reproduction of the higher-level entity. For instance, in the 
transition to multicellularity, most of the cells in a multicellular organism are not directly 
transmitting their genetic material to the next generation of the multicellular organism. 
This suggests that natural selection moved from acting upon the cells as separate entities 
to working on the collective cells as an individual. Understanding how such transitions 
occur fits well with MLS questions: when and how does selection on a group or 
collection of individuals result in the creation of a new individual that subsumes the 
members of the collective as components (Reeve and Keller, 1999; Okasha, 2006)? 
The concept of a group revisited: While still a subject of discussion, the 
challenge regarding what should count as a group for the purpose of group-level selection 
has changed with the rise of multilevel selection. The subject now connects multiple 
topics, including discussions of individuality that arose in the context of species selection 
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(e.g., Ghiselin 1974: Hull 1976; see also, Vrba 1984; Gould 2002; Joblonski 2008), the 
units of selection as visualized by Lewontin (1970), and the more generalized 
replicator/interactor distinction (Dawkins 1982; Hull 1980). Because the new challenge is 
to define and identify the kinds of entities capable of evolving via natural selection—at 
whatever level of biological organization they may be—the particular issues that Wilson 
(1983) addressed are now part of much broader discussions regarding what biological 
entities are capable of evolution. This point is illustrated by the fifth column of Table 1.5 
from  chapter  1,  showing  definitions  of  “group”  that  barely mentioned the group at all, 
since they instead focused on describing general evolutionary units and mentioned that 
the group might serve as such a unit or level. For example, Okasha (2006) used the terms 
“particle”  and  “collective”  to  distinguish  between nested entities: 
Intuitively, if selection is to operate at multiple levels, and lead to 
evolution, then entities at each level must satisfy the three requirements 
[of character variation, associated differences in fitness, and heritability]. 
Thus in a two-level scenario, the particles must vary with respect to a 
heritable character and differ in fitness as a result; and similarly for the 
collectives. If this is right, then the essence of multilevel selection is the 
simultaneous existence of character differences, associated differences in 
fitness, and heritability at more than one hierarchical level. (Okasha 
2006:47) 
 
Perhaps the most influential of these generalized concepts were developed by 
Dawkins (1976, 1982) and Hull (1980). Dawkins (1982), in presenting a general 
framework to discuss how selection acts upon a hierarchical system, framed the 
distinction  as  one  between  “replicators”  and  “vehicles.”  Replicators,  Dawkins  argued,  are  
the units that actually reproduce and are passed from one generation to the next while 
vehicles are higher-level entities upon which selection directly acts. Following this 
distinction, Dawkins (1976) argued that genes are replicators and that organisms, and 
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perhaps even groups or species, are simply vehicles. Hull (1980, 2001) disagreed that 
there  was  a  “natural  division”  of  gene/organism/species  as  used  by  Dawkins  and  instead  
preferred  the  wording  of  “replicator”  and  “interactor”  so  as  to  not  presuppose  a  specific  
organization of the biological hierarchy: 
If the traditional organizational hierarchy is retained, then both replication 
and interaction wander from level to level. The oblivious solution to this 
state of affairs is to replace the traditional organization hierarchy with a 
hierarchy whose levels are delineated in terms of the evolutionary process 
itself. (Hull 2001:23) 
 
In other words, Hull argued that entities at multiple levels, rather than just genes, could 
potentially serve as replicators and the same should also be true of interactors. Thus, by 
the definitions of both Dawkins and Hull, the concept of replicator and interactor (or 
vehicle) was intended to be generalizable, such that replicator represents the unit of 
heredity, while the vehicle or interactor represents the entities that interact with the 
environment, both biotic and abiotic, so as to allow for differential replication (Dawkins 
1976, 1982; Hull 2001). As such, rather than asking what kind of groups are capable of 
responding to group-level selection, they argued that the question is about whether 
groups are replicators or vehicles (Dawkins 1982) or even both (Hull 2001; Brandon 
1999). 
Brandon  (1982,  1990),  proposed  a  similar  distinction  with  the  terms  “unit  of  
selection”  and  “level  of  selection.”  Brandon  later  wrote  that  he  was  unaware  of  the  
Dawkins/Hull distinction, and thus his unit/level distinction follows the same logic: the 
unit of selection maps to the replicator while the level of selection maps to the interactor 
(Brandon  1999).  In  this  sense,  Brandon’s  definitions  match  Hull’s  most  closely,  since 
Brandon considered the possibility that some levels above the organism, such as 
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communities,  might  be  both  replicators  and  interactors.  Note,  however,  that  Brandon’s  
usage  of  “unit  of  selection”  is  different  than  Lewontin’s  (1970), as what Lewontin 
described  as  a  “unit  of  selection”  Brandon  called  a  “level  of  selection”  (Brandon  1999).  
Adding  to  this  potential  confusion,  other  researchers  prefer  to  use  the  terms  “unit  of  
selection”  and  “level  of  selection”  interchangeably  (e.g.,  Okasha  2006). 
With discussions in multilevel selection during the 1990s and after, particularly 
those related to major evolutionary transitions, new questions were added to the 
challenge  of  how  to  define  and  identify  units  and  levels  of  selection.  Brandon’s  
distinction was intended help researchers determine the particular level at which selection 
is acting. But along with understanding evolution as it occurs across multiple levels 
simultaneously, many MLS researchers have added the goal of understanding how 
higher-level entities can be formed from the integration of lower level-entities. That is, to 
use  Hull’s  terminology,  asking  how  selection  can  lead  to  the  creation  of  new  interactors  
(e.g., Michod and Nedelcu 2003; Okasha 2006). 
Finally,  the  challenge  of  defining  “individuals”  in the sense that Ghiselin (1974) 
and Hull (1976) proposed, and identifying which levels of biological organization might 
count as individuals, has become even more complicated with recent realizations that 
many entities traditionally considered paragons of individuality—such as humans and 
charismatic megafauna—are themselves linked with diverse bacterial, fungal, and viral 
communities. For example, one recent study of the wasp Nasonia suggested some of the 
species boundaries are maintained by differences in the composition of their 
endosymbiotic communities (Brucker and Bordenstein 2013). Studies such as this are 
demonstrating a growing need to understand the function of holobionts: the combinations 
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of organism and their endosymbionts. The growing study of holobionts in humans, 
plants, and corals has even led some to argue that holobionts are themselves types of 
organisms (Gordon 2013), while others argue that we should stop thinking about 
genomes and focus on hologenomes as units of selection (Rosenberg et al. 2007; Singh et 
al. 2013; Gilbert et al. 2013; McFall-Ngai et al. 2013). Notice that in many ways these 
are conceptual extensions of earlier discussions, such as whether multispecies 
assemblages are interactors, as Hull might call them, or units of selection as Brandon 
described. The line of reasoning that holobionts might be units of selection also echoes 
arguments that entire communities of species might be units of selection (e.g., Lewontin 
1970; Whitham et al. 2003; Whitham et al. 2006; Collins 2003).  
 
Changes related to empirical evidence: new empirical studies of multilevel 
selection 
In 1983 only a handful of experimental studies had explicitly tested the feasibility 
of group-level selection. There are now many more laboratory and field studies, including 
some framed to address multilevel selection and some still framed just as the early group 
selection experiments. 
Following  Wade’s  experiments  in  the  late  1970s  with  flour  beetles  (1976,  1977,  
1979), some researchers collaborated on the same system (Slatkin and Wade 1978; Wade 
and McCauley 1980; McCauley and Wade 1980) while others pursued their own group 
selection  experiments  (Craig  1982).  In  the  1980s,  Goodnight,  one  of  Wade’s  students,  
published the first group selection experiment using a plant system, demonstrating a 
response to selection on total leaf cover for small groups of Arabidopsis (Goodnight 
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1985; see also Goodnight et al. 1992). The 1990s saw the publication of an ongoing 
selection experiment in chickens, demonstrating a response to selection on the number of 
eggs laid in multi-hen cages (Muir 1996; Craig and Muir 1996). In the late 1990s, 
Goodnight and Stevens (1997) published a review of empirical group selection studies, 
including both laboratory experiments and quantitative fieldwork, nearly all of which 
showed a response to selection, followed by experiments in fish that showed no response 
to selection (Baer et al. 2000) and an experiment selecting on increased population size 
of parasitic nematodes that showed a response in some populations, but not others 
(Bashey and Lively 2009). 
Since the early 1980s, studies have also been conducted on other levels of 
organization, such as two-species assemblages of Tribolium (Goodnight 1990a, b), 
multispecies assemblages of bacterial soil communities (Swenson et al. 2000a, b), and 
the communities formed by tree species with their associated arthropod inhabitants 
(Whitham et al. 2003; Whitham et al. 2006). 
Most multilevel selection experiments demonstrate responses to selection at levels 
other than that of the organism (Table 2.1). Some of these cases demonstrate the 
importance of tracking multiple levels of selection to estimate the final result of selection 
by showing that both group and organismal selection can contribute to a single response. 
Yet, even the experiments that showed no response are useful for understanding the 
conditions under which particular levels of organization are likely to respond to selection.  
Wilson (1983) argued that group selection as a theory should move toward 
developing predictions for when group-level selection will be overwhelmed by 
organismal-level selection. With the rise of multilevel selection as a topic of study this 
  59 
same argument still applies, as we should be working to understand the conditions under 
which selection will act simultaneously across multiple levels of organization, or the 
conditions under which selection at one level will drive the evolutionary response and 
create units or interactors as described above. For instance, a recent series of experiments 
with single-celled yeast exerted a selection pressure by centrifuging and then propagating 
from the heaviest subset of the supernatant (Ratclif et al. 2013). These experiments have 
resulted in an otherwise single-celled variety of yeast that creates small multi-cell 
assemblages that then reproduce by budding new multi-cell assemblages. Under these 
selection conditions, where size is most important, the multi-cell groups outcompete even 
the largest single-celled yeast in what was called a demonstration of the transition from 
single cell to multicellular organisms (Ratclif et al. 2013). 
 
Similarities with respect to empirical evidence: experiments show response to 
group selection 
I have already described some of the new experimental studies published since the 
1980s (Table 2.1). While the number of studies and types of systems studied has 
increased, the overall conclusion that, in the laboratory, group-level selection can be 
responsible for an evolutionary response remains strongly supported. Indeed, this 
conclusion has been supported again and again, even in the face of competing organismal 
level selection (e.g., Wade 1976, 1977; Goodnight 1985; Muir 1996; Craig and Muir 
1996; Bashey and Lively 2009), and using either MLS1 or MLS2. Thus, the conclusion 
that there is experimental evidence for multilevel selection has not changed.  
  
  60 
Table 2.1 – Experimental studies of group and multilevel selection published before 2000 
 
Author(s), Year Study Species Common Name Observed 
Response? 
Wade 1976/1977 Tribolium castaneum Red Flour Beetle Yes 
Wade 1979 Tribolium castaneum Red Flour Beetle Yes 
McCauley and Wade 
1980; Wade and 
McCauley 1980 
Tribolium castaneum Red Flour Beetle Yes 
Wade 1980 Tribolium castaneum Red Flour Beetle Yes 
Craig 1982 Tribolium castaneum Red Flour Beetle Yes 
Wade 1982 Tribolium castaneum Red Flour Beetle Yes 
Wool 1982 Tribolium castaneum Red Flour Beetle No 
Goodnight 1985 Arabidopsis thaliana  Thale cress (plant) Yes 
Breden and Wade 1989 Plagiodera versicolor  Willow Leaf 
Beetle 
Yes 
Garcia and Toro 1990 Tribolium castaneum Red Flour Beetle Yes 
Goodnight 1990a, b T. castaneum and T. 
confusum 
Red Flour Beetles  Yes 
Wade and Goodnight 
1991 
Tribolium castaneum Red Flour Beetle Yes 
Muir 1996; Craig and 
Muir 1996 
Gallus gallus Domesticated 
Chicken 
Yes 
Swensen et al. 2000a Unidentified Microbial soil 
communities 
Yes 
Swensen et al. 2000b Unidentified Microbial soil 
communities 
Yes 
Baer et al. 2000 Heterandria formosa  Dwarf Livebearer 
(fish) 
No 
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Similarities with respect to methodology: arguments against group selection, 
arguments for plurality, and confusion about the history 
Arguments against group selection: Just as in 1983, current criticisms of group 
and multilevel selection come in a variety of forms. Note here that I mention both group 
and multilevel selection because, while some researchers level their arguments against 
the current conception of multilevel selection, many continue to argue against group 
selection without apparent knowledge of, or at least reference to, multilevel selection at 
all. Some researchers base their arguments upon current empirical or theoretical 
evidence, though many rely on arguments that are now outdated. 
Eldakar and Wilson (2011) provided eight criticisms of group selection that are 
still used despite no longer being supported by current data or theory. Of the eight 
criticisms, six were criticisms that Wilson (1983) addressed either explicitly or implicitly 
(Table 2.2). For instance, criticism 1 is exactly the point that Wilson (1983) addressed as 
a problem of calculating the local versus global fitness of an allele, while criticism 3 is 
merely a variant of criticism 1. Indeed, not only was this point addressed in 1983, Wilson 
has continued to argue against this style of calculating fitness, which he and Sober have 
named  “the  averaging  fallacy”  (e.g.,  Sober  and  Wilson  1998;;  see  also  Okasha  2004a, 
2006).  
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Table 2.2. Group Selection Criticisms Addressed by Eldakar and Wilson (2011)  
 
Number Criticism described by Eldakar and Wilson Addressed by 
Wilson (1983): 
Criticism No. 1 The fact that a trait evolves in the total 
population is an argument against group 
selection 
 
         X 
Criticism No. 2 If a trait increases the absolute fitness of an 
individual, it does not require group selection 
to evolve 
 
Criticism No. 3 Conceptualizing the group as the social 
environment of the individual is an argument 
against group selection 
 
         X 
Criticism No. 4 Frequency-dependent selection is an 
argument against group selection 
 
Criticism No. 5 The fact that a trait can be measured in 
individuals means that it evolved by 
individual-level selection 
 
         X 
Criticism No. 6 Group selection is theoretically implausible          X 
Criticism No. 7 There is little empirical support for group 
selection 
         X 
Criticism No. 8 Group selection requires limited dispersal 
among groups 
         X 
 
 
 
Not only have these now outdated criticisms plagued researchers attempting to 
work on the topic of group-level selection, the prevalence of outdated criticisms has 
fostered a sense of continued doubt about the validity of the theoretical framework in 
which the ideas of group-level selection are applied (Reeve and Keller 1999). As a 
consequence, some biologists simply avoid discussing group selection for fear of 
becoming entangled in the controversy, which is precisely one reason that Wilson (1983) 
wrote his review. For instance,  compare  Wilson’s  (1983)  comment  about  researchers  
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avoiding connecting their work to group selection with a quote from Eldakar and Wilson 
(2011): 
So many people think of group selection as a bogeyman, however, that 
they are reluctant to accept any connection with their own favored ideas, 
and all efforts go toward finding differences. (Wilson 1983:180) 
 
Imagine submitting an article to a journal or a grant proposal to a funding 
agency, contemplating whether to explicitly frame your work in terms of 
group selection. Anticipating the comments that you are likely to receive, 
it is tempting to avoid using the term, even if group selection is clearly 
being invoked. Why not frame your work in terms of what evolves in the 
total population, the group as a social environment, or frequency-
dependent selection instead? (Eldakar and Wilson 2011:1526) 
 
Indeed, some researchers might actively avoid publically placing their work 
within a particular theoretical framework simply to avoid the possible controversy. For 
instance,  during  the  symposium  “In  Light  of  Evolution  V:  Cooperation,”  Steve  Frank  
(2011) gave an enlightening talk discussing pathology as a result of evolutionary conflict. 
In his talk, Frank described the tradeoff in microbes between rapid uptake of nutrients 
and efficient conversion to biomass. This rate versus yield relationship means that higher 
levels  of  relatedness  tend  to  correlate  with  “cooperation”  i.e.,  lower  rates  of  consumption  
and thus higher total biomass yields. This idea could certainly fit within either a group 
selection or kin selection framework, but rather than identify with one or the other, Frank 
seemed  to  intentionally  avoid  the  controversy:  “call  it  group  selection  call  it  kin  selection,  
it  really  doesn't  matter.” 
That researchers would avoid using group selection phrasing, even when they 
admit that it could apply to their work, is perhaps unsurprising given the criticism that 
some have received when using such wording in the past. For instance, Wynne-Edwards 
was ridiculed for his group selection arguments and even into the 1990s he had difficulty 
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publishing some of his work on the subject (Racey 1997). Worse still, some 
contemporary views of group and multilevel selection are so polarized that both 
proponents and opponents claim that their view is the only proper and accepted approach. 
For  example,  compare  this  quote  from  Coyne’s  (2012)  online  writings  with  the  following  
quote from Eldakar and Wilson (2011):   
Coyne (2012): The problem with all this is that the arguments for group 
selection are being made in books aimed at the general public, but the 
critical responses by evolutionary biologists are not only buried in 
technical papers, but involve arcane scientific arguments that sometimes 
use (horrors!) mathematics. So while group selection may flourish in the 
public  mind,  it’s  moribund  to  most  evolutionary  biologists  who  have  
followed the technical debates in the literature. 
(http://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2012/06/24/the-demise-of-
group-selection/, accessed 9/5/2013) 
 
Eldakar and Wilson (2011:1526): Group selection is often portrayed as a 
subject that remains controversial after many decades. It would be more 
accurate to say that group selection remains confusing to many people 
after many decades. To anyone with a basic understanding of multilevel 
selection theory, the core question of whether a trait can evolve on the 
strength of between-group selection, even when selectively dis-
advantageous within groups, was definitively answered long ago. 
 
When biologists on both sides make claims that their argument is the only one supported 
by  “most  evolutionary  biologists”  or  “anyone  with  a  basic  understanding  of  multilevel  
selection  theory,”  then  which  side  are  those  unfamiliar  with  the  topic  supposed  to  
support? Given the factual nature of these claims, it is perhaps surprising that they should 
be so contradictory, as the truth is likely somewhere in between. Coyne and others are 
clearly wrong when claiming that no evolutionary biologists ever consider group or 
multilevel selection, as evidenced by the experimental studies mentioned above, while 
Wilson and others are so frequently in the habit of having to defend their views that they 
are perhaps overzealous in their responses. 
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Arguments for plurality: Wilson (1983) argued that inclusive fitness models and 
the group selection models were simply alternative ways of studying the same 
evolutionary  processes.  A  key  difference  he  added  was  that  inclusive  fitness  “correctly  
predicts the final outcome but does not distinguish clearly between the opposing forces of 
group  and  individual  selection,  as  they  are  defined  within  the  group  selection  traditions”  
(Wilson 1983:177). But, because they were simply different approaches for analyzing the 
same process, Wilson argued that they were equally valid and both should be used. 
Wilson (1983) also argued that the study of evolution would benefit from a plurality of 
useful approaches to the problems that evolutionary biologists seek to explain. 
Thirty years later, Wilson and others are still making these same arguments for a 
plurality of models and methods for studying selection across multiple levels of 
organization rather than supporting arguments that one should be used to the exclusion of 
all others. For instance, Sober and Wilson (1998) argued that as long as different 
alternatives lead to different useful insights, they deserve to coexist. Sober and Wilson 
(1998) also argued that researchers and theoreticians must make a distinction between 
process and perspective, by realizing that there are multiple perspectives, but that these 
various perspectives do not necessarily represent different processes. This means that the 
fact one perspective is able to explain the insights of the other is not necessarily a 
legitimate argument against either perspective: 
When one theory achieves an insight by virtue of its perspective, the same 
insight can usually be explained in retrospect by the other theories. As 
long as the relationships among the theories are clearly understood, this 
kind of pluralism is a healthy part of science. (Sober and Wilson 1998:98) 
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This kind of pluralism could play an important part in the development of evolutionary 
theory. Once this has happened, Sober and Wilson argued, a unified evolutionary theory 
for social behavior will emerge: 
We believe that a legitimate pluralism is possible and that it will lead to a 
unified evolutionary theory of social behavior. The theories that have been 
celebrated as alternatives to group selection are nothing of the sort. They 
are different ways of viewing evolution in multigroup populations. (Sober 
and Wilson 1998:57) 
 
Others have provided similar arguments in favor of a plurality of perspectives to 
the development of evolutionary theory. For instance, Dugatkin and Reeve (1994:130) 
argued: 
Certain ecological scenarios are best approached from the individual 
selection road, whereas others are best traversed from the trait-group-
selection  path.  Behavioral  ecologists  can  only  profit  by  having  the  ‘nuts  
and  bolts’  of  each  approach  in  their  conceptual  toolbox. 
 
Reeve and Keller (1999:4) also noted how alternative perspectives can be 
interchangeable: 
The particularly frustrating aspect of these constantly renewed debates is 
that, even though they seem to be sparked by rival theories about how 
evolution works, in fact, they often involve only rival metaphors for the 
very same evolutionary logic and are thus empirically empty.  
 
Okasha (2006) provided even more detail on the topic of plurality, highlighting 
that there are actually a series of issues upon which a researcher might be a pluralist with 
respect to multilevel selection. Among these is pluralism about representation of the 
evolutionary process, which all of the researchers just mentioned seem to describe, as 
well as pluralism about causality of the process, and pluralism about the hierarchical 
organization of the systems we study. This last point seems  to  capture  Hull’s  (1980,  
2001) sentiments on the topic of the levels of selection. Finally, Bijma and Wade (2008) 
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represent a practical example of studying how multilevel selection, kin selection, and 
indirect genetic effects can all influence the overall response to selection. 
One of the popular arguments against including multilevel selection in a plurality 
of perspectives to understanding the process of selection is the claim that relying upon 
multilevel selection as an explanation is unnecessary because kin selection can provide a 
superior account for any case that group or multilevel selection can explain. An example 
of  this  argument  can  be  found  in  the  “Social  Semantics”  series  of  exchanges  in  the  
Journal of Evolutionary Biology between West, Griffin, and Gardner (2007, 2008), and 
Wilson (2008). 
West et al. (2007), responding to what they considered general semantic 
confusions within the study of social behavior, argued that the presence of different 
meaning for the same terms, and different terms for the same meanings, have hindered 
progress in evolutionary biology.  They  argued  that  such  miscommunication  “can  obscure  
what  is  biologically  important,  and  what  is  not”  (West  et al. 2007:415), including group 
selection  which  has  “generated  a  huge  amount  of  semantic  confusion”  (West  et al. 
2007:423):  
Although this debate was solved decisively during the 1960s to 1980s, by 
evolutionary biologists, it seems to reoccur and lead to confusion as new 
fields embrace the relevant aspects of social evolution theory. 
 
In particular, West et al. highlighted the differences between what they called the  “old”  
group selection  and  “new”  group  selection—essentially equating the verbal and 
mathematical  models  Wilson  1983  described  as  “old  group  selection”  and  the  IGS  
models  as  “new”  group  selection—and argued that the potential  validity  of  the  “new,” 
IGS, models  might  lead  some  to  falsely  apply  the  “old”  models.  Notice that they hint at a 
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variety of definitions for the concept of a group, but focus on differences in what is meant 
by  “group  selection”  rather  than  the  underlying issue of what counts as a group at all. I 
should also add here that West et al. (2007) only address group-level selection and make 
no mention of multilevel selection or  Damuth  and  Heisler’s  (1988) work, despite the fact 
that this was exactly the type of semantic confusion that prompted Damuth and Heisler to 
distinguish between MLS1 and MLS2. 
Wilson  (2008:368),  in  an  effort  “to  maximize  the  benefits  of  pluralism  while  
minimizing  the  semantic  costs”  responded  with  a  critique  of  West  et al.’s  (2007)  article, 
particularly disagreeing with their characterization of group selection. While Wilson 
agreed with the goal of clarifying semantic confusion, he argued that West et al. failed to 
present  a  “genuine  pluralism”:   
Genuine pluralism requires crediting a given framework for achieving 
insights that were not forthcoming from other frameworks, even if they 
can be accounted for in retrospect. (Wilson 2008:371) 
 
Wilson (2008) also argued that West et al. (2007) made three major errors in their 
analysis by, 1) presenting  the  “new” group selection—IGS—as having no historical 
connection  with  the  “old”  group  selection,  2)  presenting  the  rejection  of  group  selection  
in  the  1960s  as  proper  and  justified,  and  3)  arguing  that  the  “new”  group  selection  
provides no insights that are not already provided by inclusive fitness theory. These 
points should now seem familiar, as they were largely the same points that Wilson (1983) 
raised 25 years earlier. 
West et al. (2008) replied with a defense their original claims, as well as a 
challenge  to  Wilson’s  (2008)  critiques:   
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First, as we emphasized in our original paper, we do not claim that group 
selection is incorrect. Our point was that although it can be a potentially 
useful tool, it frequently leads to confusion and time wasting. Second, 
Wilson’s  paper  is  not  a  call  for  genuine  pluralism;;  it  is  just  a  return  to  the  
old confusions about group selection, most of which were solved more 
than 20 years ago. (West et al. 2008:374) 
 
This final point suggests that there are still confusions about the history of group 
and multilevel selection arguments, otherwise Wilson (2008) and West et al. (2007, 
2008) would be unlikely to make conflicting claims about the history and status of the 
controversy surrounding group-level selection. 
Confusion about the history: Wilson (1983) reviewed the group selection 
debates because he intended to illustrate key ways in which the debates had not changed. 
However, he was careful to add that he was not sure that what he presented was 
necessarily the best possible historical narrative, and he invited others to add to what he 
had started. Yet, by the late 2000s, a different kind of historical account had become the 
version often repeated in opening paragraphs about group selection. The following 
illustrates  a  more  detailed  version  of  what  became  a  sort  of  “standard  history”  of  the  
group selection debate: 
Darwin considered something like group selection to explain cooperation 
in  humans  and  social  insects,  but  didn’t  really  invest  in  the  idea;;  
Kropotkin and Huxley had an involved debate that was thickly 
ideological; W. C. Allee and others at Chicago carried on for Kropotkin, 
sharing his preference for cooperation over competition; V. C. Wynne-
Edwards started a cascade of events in 1962 that led first to powerful 
criticisms of group selection from G. C. Williams and John Maynard 
Smith and then finally to the end of the debate with the advent of 
Hamilton’s  (1964)  inclusive  fitness  theory  and  the  rise  of  sociobiology  in  
the mid-1970s. (Hamilton and Dimond 2012:229) 
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Of course, there are many variants of this general account. For instance, here are 
three different versions, each of which seem to present the history as a single continuous 
story: 
1) Dugatkin (2006) drew upon a history of altruism, which many consider to be 
the same history as the group selection controversy. In particular, he focused on seven 
individuals he took to be the most important: Charles Darwin, Thomas Huxley, Petr 
Kropotkin, Warder C. Allee, J.B.S. Haldane, and finally William D. Hamilton and 
George Price. Though Dugatkin mentioned other researchers, their roles were all 
abbreviated. Most importantly from a historical perspective, Dugatkin (2006) portrayed 
the people and events as a single story. 
2) Leigh (2010) told the group selection story by opening with the standard 
account of Wynne-Edwards's (1962) book and its responses, but followed with a 
“prehistory” citing Wright (1929, 1932, 1945, and 1978) as invoking group selection. 
Leigh also cited Sturtevant (1938) for an argument noting that some traits can be 
favorable to the group but unfavorable to the individual and Lewontin's (1962) 
description of the t-allele system in mice, which Lewontin (1970) offered as a notable 
example of selection working at multiple levels. Most importantly, Leigh (2010) argued 
that there were two main reasons biologists invoked group selection: 1) to explain 
evolution of cooperation among individuals, as most use it, and 2) Wright's use of the 
spread of advantageous genotypes in complex epigenetic systems. In this sense, Leigh 
seems to follow the distinction that Wright (1980) himself made regarding his work and 
group selection, with the caveat that Leigh (2010) also considered it appropriate to 
describe  Wright’s  characterization  of  how  selection  operated  as  “group  selection.” 
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3) Borello (2010) told a more complete story of the early disputes regarding the 
idea of group-level selection. He began with an argument that Darwin considered how 
natural selection could apply to levels other than the organism, such as Darwin's (1871) 
descriptions of how a group of men who cooperated would out-compete a group of men 
who did not. Borrello (2010) then followed the group selection history through 
Krotpotkin's  (1902)  view  of  cooperation  as  the  driving  force  for  evolution  and  Huxley’s  
(1893) opposing view that competition is the  main  force  of  selection.  Borello’s (2010) 
main focus was V.C. Wynne-Edwards and his disagreements with David Lack, using the 
publication of Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behavior (Wynne-Edwards 1962) 
as  the  “structural  spine”  in an analysis of what motivated Wynne-Edwards’  work,  as  well  
as demonstrating the wide range of reactions that the book provoked. For a more detailed 
review of Borello (2010), see Hamilton and Dimond (2012). 
Notice that these examples, as do many others, fail to mention a few noteworthy 
events that occurred after the 1960s. In particular, some of the primary critics of group 
selection during the 1960s, including Williams and Hamilton, later softened their 
criticisms or even reversed their arguments entirely. For instance, in the reissued 1996 
preface  of  Williams’s  (1966)  book,  he  reflected: 
A few years after 1966, I was being given credit for showing that the 
adaptation concept was not usually applicable at the population or higher 
levels, and that Wynne-Edwards’s  thesis  that  group  selection  regularly  
leads to regulation of population density by individual restraints on 
reproduction was without merit. It also became fashionable to cite my 
work (sometimes, I suspect, by people who had not read it) as showing 
that effective selection above the individual level can be ruled out. My 
recollection, and my current interpretation of the text, especially of 
Chapter 4, indicate that this is a misreading. I concluded merely that group 
selection was not strong enough to produce what I termed biotic 
adaptation: any complex mechanism clearly designed to augment the 
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success of a population or a more inclusive group. A biotic adaptation 
would  be  characterized  by  organisms’  playing  roles  that  would  
subordinate their individual interests for some higher value, as in the often 
proposed benefit to the species. (Williams 1996:xii) 
 
Notice that the distinction Williams seems to be making here is essentially between 
MLS1 and MLS2, where MLS2 at the group-level would require identifying what he 
called biotic adaptations. But such a requirement does nothing to rule out the possibility 
of MLS1 group-level selection that would influence the fitness of organisms within 
groups.   
Similarly, Hamilton described in his autobiography his initial dislike of the group 
selection idea until a phone call in which George Price asked if Hamilton had seen what 
Price’s  work,  “a  covariance  formula  the  like  of  which  I  had  never  seen”  (Hamilton  
1996:173), did for group selection:  
I  told  him,  of  course,  no,  and  may  have  added  something  like:  ‘So  you  
actually  believe  in  that  do  you?’  Up  to  this  contact  with  Price,  and  indeed  
for some time after, I had regarded group selection as so ill defined, so 
wooly in the uses made by its proponents, and so generally powerless 
against individual and genic levels, that the idea might as well be omitted 
from the toolkit of a working evolutionist.  
 
I am pleased to say that, amidst all else that I ought to have done and did 
not do, some months before he [Price] died I was on the phone telling him 
enthusiastically  that  through  a  ‘group-level’  extension  of  his  formula  I  
now had a far better understanding of group selection and was possessed 
of a far better tool for all forms of selection acting at one level or at many 
than I had ever had before. (Hamilton 1996:173) 
 
There are, however, some authors who do not present the history of group and 
multilevel selection as a single story. For instance, Reeve and Keller (1999) while 
attempting  to  “make  yet  one  more attempt to bury the issue that usually usurps 
discussions  of  the  level  of  selection  at  the  expense  of  the  truly  interesting  issues”  
(1999:3), did not describe a single long history of group selection. Instead, they 
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characterized the controversy as a series  of  “cyclic  debates”  regarding  the  application  of  
individuality  to  different  levels  in  order  to  find  the  “true”  unit  of  selection:   
This issue emerges in cyclic debates about (a) whether genes or 
individuals are best seen as the true unit of selection, and (b) whether 
groups of individuals can be units of selection. In our opinion, these 
questions have been satisfactorily answered repeatedly, only to reappear 
subsequently with naïve ferocity in new biological subdisciplines (e.g., the 
group-selection controversy is currently generating copious amounts of 
smoke within the human sciences; see, e.g., Wilson and Sober 1994 and 
responses; Sober and Wilson 1998). (Reeve and Keller 1999:3-4, original 
citations included) 
 
Thus,  in  Reeve  and  Keller’s  (1999)  account of the history, a series of debates begin and 
end before starting anew in a new field. But even within the human sciences, group 
selection had been discussed since the 1980s with the use of group-level selection in 
explaining cultural evolution (Boyd and Richerson 1985, 2005; Richerson and Boyd 
2005; see also Henrich and Henrich 2007). Indeed, even the works that Reeve and Keller 
cite, Wilson and Sober (1994) and Sober and Wilson (1998), build upon insights 
provided by the human behavioral sciences (e.g., Boyd and Richerson 1985) as well as 
the then-current work in evolutionary biology. This demonstrates much more temporal 
overlap to the debates than Reeve and Keller (1999) described. This point also suggests, 
particularly when coupled with the wide diversity of the narratives provided above, that 
there are entire areas of MLS research not included in most of the historical account.  
To explain these discrepancies, I argue that rather than a single continuous debate, 
or even multiple independent debates, the history of the controversy over group-level 
selection is better viewed as a series of interrelated topics and associated debates. 
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Multiple Histories  
A first step in disentangling the issues surrounding the ongoing group and 
multilevel selection controversy is to appreciate that researchers have addressed the topic 
from a variety of contexts and have viewed different points as needing to be explained. 
For the differences in debates across time, the historical context of the time period in 
which the arguments were presented likely has a large influence on the kinds of questions 
that were asked. In contrast, for the differences in debates within particular times, the 
backgrounds that motivated the particular researchers might be better explanations for the 
differences in their questions and research.  
For instance, consider the long-term disagreement between Wright (1929, 1932, 
1945, 1978, 1980) and Fisher (1918, 1937, 1941, 1953, 1958) about whether it was better 
to characterize selection as acting on subdivided populations in which mating is more 
likely between individuals in the same deme or panmictic populations in which mating 
among all individuals is equally likely. As previously mentioned, many researchers have 
connected  Wright’s  work  to  group  and  multilevel  selection,  but  for  Wright, the 
motivating issue was how gene frequencies might change as a result of selection or drift 
within and between subdivisions—or groups—that collectively composed a larger 
population. See Winther et al. (2013) for more of my work on the group selection 
controversy compared with the Fisher-Wright debate. 
Contrast  Wright’s  and  Fisher’s  argument  with  those of Wynne-Edwards and 
Lack: Wynne-Edwards (1962) responding to Lack (1954), debated how best to explain 
the fact that some bird species were biologically capable of laying more eggs than were 
found in the average nest. Wynne-Edwards thought that selection at the group-level 
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provided an explanation, interpreting certain behaviors as evidence that birds were 
restraining themselves relative to the potential number of offspring they might produce. 
A similar example of restraint was the fact that some sexually mature individuals forego 
their own reproduction to assist parents or siblings in raising young. Lack (1966) 
responded to Wynne-Edwards’s  (1962)  challenge  by  providing  numerous  arguments  
countering the examples Wynne-Edwards presented, arguing that the behaviors observed 
could be explained by the birds maximizing their reproduction relative to the resources 
required. Thus cases where younger birds forwent reproduction to help raise siblings 
could be viewed as individually beneficial with inclusive fitness models. It was only in 
Lack’s  (1966)  appendix that he explicitly argued against Wynne-Edwards’s  (1962)  
group-level selection as theoretically ungrounded. 
During the same time period, however, Maynard Smith (1964) responded to 
Wynne-Edwards (1962) with an article that renamed Hamilton's (1964) inclusive fitness 
approach kin selection and argued it was an alternative to group selection that remained 
consistent with individual selection. Williams (1966, 1996) argued that group selection, if 
even possible, was likely a weak force compared to selection at the organismal or genic 
levels. These two responses were aimed at the theoretical sufficiency of group selection 
rather than the empirical examples that Wynne-Edwards provided. Indeed, Williams was 
not even aware of Wynne-Edwards’s book until he was nearly finished writing his own 
(1966) work (Williams 1996). 
Finally, compare the above disputes with the exchange between West et al. (2007, 
2008) and Wilson (2008), which is best understood as a conflict over the theoretical 
usefulness of group selection and the perceived costs of semantic confusion over the 
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associated words and concepts. Much of this disagreement also seems to be grounded 
upon factual disputes over the history of the group selection controversy. 
These examples do not represent a single, continuous debate regarding group-
level selection. Rather, they provide examples of debates on different topics largely 
occurring at different times, that all fall under the subject of group or multilevel selection. 
As such, they are not necessarily connected one to the other in the sense that one is an 
explicit response to another. Fisher and Wright argued about the best context for 
selection, a panmictic or subdivided population; Wynne-Edwards and Lack debated 
interpretations of data; Maynard Smith and Williams relied on mathematical and 
theoretical arguments against the plausibility of group selection occurring; while West et 
al. and Wilson disagreed about the usefulness of group selection or multilevel selection 
as a theory. Thus, rather than a single debate, as the history is often viewed, this brief 
account shows how the particular framing of questions by different researchers, as well as 
the evidence that they used, differentiated efforts to understand the level of biological 
organization at which natural selection acts.  
 
Conclusions 
Using  “keyword”  style  methods,  I  have  shown  the  ways  central ideas at stake in 
the debates about group-level selection have and have not changed since the early 1980s. 
By viewing the history of group and multilevel selection as a series of interrelated 
debates separated by the ways questions were framed and the historical context within 
which research occurred, it becomes easier to understand why researchers disagree about 
whether  “the”  group  selection  debate  was  settled  and  why  different  researchers  seem  to  
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think it was settled at different times. Though the broad subject has remained largely the 
same—that is, exploring the possibility that natural selection can act at multiple levels of 
biological organization—many of the specific topics, as well as the associated questions 
and types of evidence used, have varied over time, which is illustrated by all that has 
changed in the discussions since the early 1960s. 
In particular, I have shown how the conceptual and empirical aspects of these 
debates have changed: new models were proposed and debated, new empirical studies 
were conducted and interpreted, and new theoretical frameworks developed that provide 
for broader explanatory power. In contrast, conflicts that remain little changed are largely 
related to methodology, including differences of opinion about whether pluralism is 
appropriate, disputes about the best way to estimate allelic fitness, and even arguments 
about the basic usefulness of group or multilevel selection as a theory. Given these two 
points, it seems reasonable to wonder: How will these debates change in the future? 
Wilson (1983) argued that group selection should be integrated with other major 
concepts in evolutionary biology, reflecting that, 
one  of  the  most  striking  features  of  the  “new”  group  selection  [IGS]  is  its  
relation to other major concepts, such as inclusive fitness, game theory, 
and reciprocity. In the past these have been treated as rival theories, with 
every effort being devoted to accentuating their differences. Now it is 
apparent that they can be united within a single frame work [sic] and that 
far more is to be gained by emphasizing their similarities. (Wilson 
1983:160) 
 
For some, multilevel selection is that unification – or has the potential to be. However, as 
long as we continue to argue about the same details that have been debated since the 
1960s, even the potential for a unification of theory will continue to be denied. As Reeve 
and Keller (1999) argued, it is time to move to more interesting questions. Viewing the 
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history of these conversations as a series of interrelated topics allows for the 
understanding that within these discussions new and interesting topics of debates can 
arise and then be settled over time. This is the style of debate that seems useful for the 
field, as it allows for building upon the arguments of the past while also supporting 
movement into new topics of discussion and debate. For instance, for what questions and 
under which biological conditions is it more productive to start with a multilevel 
selection model rather than an inclusive fitness model? Under what conditions might we 
expect that group-level selection will be a driver for evolution, and for which 
organizational levels, and under what conditions might we reasonably ignore it? 
If we move toward these and other new questions, then the answer to the question 
posed  in  this  chapter’s  title—Why are we still arguing about group selection? —becomes: 
“Because  we  are  working  to make  the  theory  of  multilevel  selection  even  stronger.” 
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CHAPTER 3 
DIFFERING WAYS OF STUDYING MULTILEVEL SELECTION AND THEIR 
IMPLICATIONS FOR EXPERIMENTAL DATA AND THEORETICAL 
ARGUMENTS 
Abstract 
In this chapter I provide a framework for understanding the ongoing disputes 
about group selection, and multilevel selection more generally, by arguing that there are 
different  “approaches”  to  the  study  of  multilevel  selection  distinguished  by  where  the  
research falls upon two axes: 1) whether the researcher is primarily interested in a single 
level of organization or multiple levels, and 2) the extent to which the work starts from a 
theoretical  or  empirical  perspective.  I  then  describe  four  such  “approaches”  including  the  
questions asked and the methods used. I then discuss how these different approaches 
might lead to conflicting interpretations of the same empirical data by using the Nasonia 
experiment from chapter 1 as an example, discussing conflicts of interpretation that might 
arise between approaches and within approaches. I also discuss how the approaches 
described here can account for some conflicts of both methodology and epistemology. By 
acknowledging these different approaches, it becomes clear why some of the controversy 
surrounding group selection continues, and in doing so provides avenues for avoiding the 
same conflicts in future research. 
 
Introduction  
In chapter 2, I argued that the history of the group selection controversy—
including the transition to discussions about multilevel selection—is best understood 
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through the lens of conceptual change as representing a series of interrelated debates 
separated by the topics and questions, as well as the favored methods and types of 
evidence, of researchers within and across particular times. In this chapter I ask whether 
this view of the history, and the lens of conceptual change, also provide insight into the 
contemporary controversy about group and multilevel selection. 
Sober and Wilson (1994), in providing an overview of the philosophy of biology 
literature on multilevel selection, argued that an important part of the debate is properly 
framing the problem that needs to be explained before an appropriate explanation can be 
found. Following this reasoning, I propose that it is possible to separate studies of group-
level selection using the intersection of two continua that represent different ways that 
researchers have attempted to frame the questions that are central to their research 
(Figure 3.1). I also argue that because of the differences in the kind of questions asked 
and general methods used—that is, theoretical or empirical—these alternative ways of 
framing the research questions may lead to differences in the interpretation of 
observational and experimental data. 
For ease of reference I will hereafter refer to these alternatives as “approaches”  to  
the study of multilevel selection. By approach I mean a particular combination of topic 
and questions along with the methods used to answer the questions. This use of the word 
“approach”  is  similar  in connotation to the way that other researchers have used the word, 
such as Wilson (e.g., 1983) when he referred to group-selection and kin selection as 
“alternative  approaches”  to  studying  the  same  process,  Goodnight and Stevens (1997) in 
describing  the  “adaptationist”  and  “genetical”  approaches  to  multilevel  selection, and 
Damuth and Heisler (1988) in describing MLS1 and MLS2 as different approaches to 
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studying selection in hierarchical systems. In other words, each of these uses of the word 
“approach” denoted—to varying extents—differences in the way that researchers framed 
the particular questions that they followed, as well as the concepts and methods that they 
used to address those questions. 
In this chapter, I first describe the two intersecting continua of “single  level  or  
multilevel”  and  “theoretical  or  empirical.”  I  then  describe the resulting approaches to the 
study of multilevel selection, using the four most extreme as examples. Next, I use the 
results of the Nasonia experiment reported in chapter 1 to demonstrate how different 
approaches can lead to different interpretations of the same empirical data. Finally, I 
describe some of the conflicts that can arise between and within these approaches, 
including epistemological and methodological, which help to explain some of the 
ongoing controversy described in chapter 2. 
 
Characterizing Research on Multilevel Selection  
Though varied fields of research have included the study of multilevel selection, 
here I will focus primarily on the biology and philosophy of biology literature in three 
areas: theoretical evolutionary biology, philosophy of biology, and experimental 
evolutionary biology. 
I propose that multilevel selection studies can be classified along two axes: 1) the 
degree to which the research focused on one level or multiple levels of biological 
organization and 2) the degree to which the research was primarily a theoretical or 
empirical analysis. Although both of these are broad continua, for ease of analysis here I 
divide them into discrete categories based on the ends of each continuum (Figure 3.1). 
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Figure 3.1. Representation of four approaches to the study of multilevel selection.  
 
Single level or multilevel: Researchers vary in whether their research focuses 
mainly on selection acting at one level or selection acting at multiple levels 
simultaneously. I call the ends of this continuum “single level” and “multilevel.” 
Researchers at one end are focused on understanding or identifying a level of selection 
most responsible for driving evolution – be it in general or for a particular trait. At the 
other extreme are researchers interested in understanding the dynamics of two or more 
levels of selection acting simultaneously that might influence evolution, including how to 
identify the multiple levels at which selection might act in general or the particular levels 
of selection contributing to the response of a given trait. 
In some ways these extremes match the distinction between MLS1 and MLS2, 
including the fact that it is the kinds of questions that each address that drive the 
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distinction (Damuth and Heisler 1988:411): “Once  one  has  decided  to  analyze  a  given  
situation in terms of multilevel selection processes both approaches are legitimate within 
that context and a choice has to be made depending upon what questions are of interest.” 
With MLS1, researchers address how the fitness of entities at one level are influenced by 
the collectives of which they are a part; for instance, how organismal fitness might be 
influenced by traits at the group-level. With MLS2, researchers address how entities at 
one level respond to selection at the same level of organization; for instance, how group 
fitness should be calculated by the reproductive act of creating new groups. 
However, the distinction between single level and multilevel that I use here is 
more than a renaming of MLS1 and MLS2.  For  instance,  Wade’s  (1976)  work  could  be  
considered MLS2 because the selection he exerted upon groups was done through 
differential reproduction and extinction of groups, yet his experiment included the ability 
to compare selection acting at multiple levels. This is why, in what follows, I describe his 
work as falling upon the multilevel end of the continuum. Equally, I can imagine the case 
of a researcher who is interested in whether selection upon an IGS modeled trait-group is 
a better explanation for a particular behavior than selection upon the organismal level. 
Though trait group models are often considered MLS1, this work would fall within the 
single level end of the continuum because the goal is in understanding the most important 
or dominant level of selection for a particular trait. 
Theoretical or empirical: While, to some degree, all work on multilevel 
selection uses both data and theory, the extent to which particular researchers rely upon 
one or the other can be placed on a continuum between the ends of primarily theoretical 
research and primarily empirical research. Theoretical researchers start with abstract 
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concepts or a priori claims and then might investigate how well data fit with these 
conceptualizations. At the other end of the continuum, empirical researchers start by 
gathering observations or experimental results and then might move to connecting those 
results and observations to existing theory or constructing new theory. Thus, at its core, 
this distinction is about the degree to which a researcher starts with a general 
understanding of the natural world and then works to create theory for how to understand 
particular cases, versus starting with one or more particular cases of empirical studies and 
working from these cases to construct theory. 
Goodnight (2005) and Goodnight and Stevens (1997), described a similar 
distinction between empirical and theoretical work by describing what they called the 
adaptationist approach, which is focused on explaining existing adaptations, and the 
genetical approach, which is focused on understanding ongoing changes either through 
experimental or observational studies. However, rather than two versions of study 
described by Goodnight and Stevens (1997), here I use these as two ends of a continuum, 
and so the distinction is not quite as sharp. Instead, the difference is in the degree to 
which data are used at the initiation of the project, or the degree to which the project 
starts from a theoretical perspective.  
To illustrate the usefulness of dividing approaches to the study of multilevel 
selection, consider a brief example from the group selection controversy during the 
1960s, focusing on four key publications that I described in chapter 2: Wynne-Edwards 
(1962), Maynard Smith (1964), Lack (1966), and Williams (1966). Because all four of 
these works were addressing whether group-level selection could be a driving force of 
evolution, they could all be categorized as single level (Figure 3.1). However, the 
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differences in the debates are easier to see when we note that Wynne-Edwards and Lack 
started with data before moving to generate theory, while Maynard Smith and Williams 
centered their arguments on theory rather than data. Thus, in key respects, Wynne-
Edwards and Lack shared one approach, while Maynard-Smith and Williams shared 
another. As I also argued in chapter 2, Wynne-Edwards and Lack also shared particular 
questions, in that they were trying to explain certain types of observed behavior, while 
Maynard Smith and Williams were responding to the general use of group-selection 
reasoning. Finally, the evidence they used also varied: Wynne-Edwards and Lack largely 
disagreed about interpretations of observations and field studies, while Maynard Smith 
and Williams used primarily mathematical and theoretical arguments, respectively.  
 
Approaches to Multilevel Selection  
In this section I will describe four approaches to the study of multilevel selection, 
starting with the goals and questions of each approach and then describing the methods of 
each approach with some examples of publications that represent those methods.  
 
Theoretical, single level  
Goals and questions: This approach includes questions aimed at understanding 
which level(s) are most important in evolutionary processes, which level should be 
considered privileged above all others, and whether selection is possible at particular 
levels such as the group or species. As I described above, the theoretical, single level 
approach was used extensively in group selection debates during the 1960s and 1970s, 
including the work of Maynard Smith (1964) and Williams (1966). This is also the 
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approach  of  Dawkins’s  (1976)  “gene’s  eye  view,”  and  the approach that Dawkins (1978, 
1982) and Hull (1980) had in mind regarding replicator/vehicle and replicator/interactor. 
Brandon (1982) created a similar distinction, between “unit of selection” and “level of 
selection,” that was also intended to separate those units that provide continuity across 
generations and the level at which selection is actually acting. 
As others have noted (e.g., Lloyd 2001, 2005), the distinctions used by Dawkins, 
Hull, and Brandon seem to divide into two general questions from the history of group 
selection debates: 1) What are the units that can serve to reproduce information and pass 
it from generation to generation – that is, what serves as the unit of heredity (replicators 
or units of selection) and 2) How does selection act upon phenotypes or levels of 
organization – that is, what are the vehicles/interactors upon which selection acts, or the 
levels of selection. One important aspect of this latter question was understanding the 
dominant level upon which selection acts, such that it made the other levels less 
important.  
The point that many of the early discussions in the history of group selection fall 
within this approach is easily explained by the fact that there were few experimental 
studies on the topic prior to the 1970s, and that during the 1960s and 1970s many of the 
discussions about group selection focused on the feasibility of group-level selection as 
contrasted with organismal-level selection. Thus, the goal was to describe the most 
important level at which selection operated rather than understanding the dynamic of 
multiple levels acting simultaneously. 
Methods and examples: Researchers and philosophers using the theoretical, 
single level approach use largely conceptual methods for thinking about selection, 
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including the replicator/interactor and the unit/level distinctions. As these were already 
discussed in chapter 1, I will forgo a detailed discussion of them here. What is relevant 
for this chapter, however, is that they were intended to help biologists identify and 
separate the levels that were capable of responding to selection and driving an 
evolutionary response from those that were important but not the ultimate unit of 
selection. As such, these were particularly useful during discussions about what kinds of 
levels of organization might be capable of evolution as a result of natural selection. 
Brandon (1982, 1990) proposed another means of identifying the level at which 
selection  is  acting,  by  identifying  the  level  of  biological  organization  that  “screens  off”  
other levels from selection in multilevel systems. Essentially, Brandon argued that 
screening off could be used to determine the actual level that selection is acting upon in a 
given case from the other potential levels of selection in that case. Following the 
distinction between phenotype and genotype, Brandon argued that because selection acts 
on the phenotype rather than the genotype, the phenotypic level will be the level at which 
selections operates. The way to identify this level, Brandon argued, is to find the level 
that  statistically  “screens  off”  all  other  levels:   
If A renders B statistically irrelevant with respect to outcome E but not 
vice versa, then A is a better causal explainer of E than is B. In symbols, A 
screens off B from E if and only if P(E,A B) = P(E,A) ≠ P(E,B). 
(Brandon 1990:83) 
 
This is to say that, when put into terms applicable for a selection experiment, if a trait at 
level A can statistically account for all of the response to selection in question, while a 
trait at level B cannot, then it is level A and not B that is the appropriate level of selection 
for the response observed. Thus, Brandon argued:  
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Selection occurs at a given level (within a common selective environment) 
if and only if 1. There is differential reproduction among the entities at 
that level; and 2. The 'phenotypes' of the entities at that level screen off 
properties of entities at every other level from reproductive values at the 
given level. (Brandon 1990:88) 
 
Brandon also added that his definition for levels of selection was “designed  to  pick  out  
levels  of  interaction”  (Brandon  1990:93). For this reason, Brandon argued that structured-
deme models—that is, IGS models—of group selection can be true group selection 
models when they identify the level most important in particular cases for the 
evolutionary process by identifying whether particular traits are adaptations to selection 
at that level. 
Other examples of the theoretical, single level approach include  Maynard  Smith’s  
(1964) haystack model exploring the conditions under which he expected group-level 
selection to be a viable force, and  Wilson’s  (1975)  trait-group model and the argument 
that a trait-group could be a level of selection that would not suffer from the criticisms 
leveled against other group selection models. 
 
Theoretical, multilevel 
Goals and questions: This approach includes questions related to how to best 
conceptualize or operationalize selection so as to allow researchers to investigate the 
dynamics of selection working across multiple levels of biological organization. In many 
cases, this includes a particular interest in understanding the net result of selection acting 
at multiple levels simultaneously, such as when two or more levels exhibit selection 
acting in opposite directions or cases in which selection at multiple levels might act 
synergistically. 
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Methods and examples: Biologists and philosophers using a theoretical, 
multilevel approach have added to how we might envision selection acting at multiple 
levels.  For  instance,  Wilson  and  Wilson  (2007)  described  “selection  vectors”  in  a  way  
analogous to how physicists describe forces acting upon an object. Wilson and Wilson 
argued that just as we would think of two equal but opposing forces as canceling out, so 
too can we think of selection at multiple levels of opposite direction but equal intensities 
as resulting in no response to selection even in the presence of heritable variation. This 
way of envisioning multiple selection pressures also applies nicely to cases of 
countervailing selection pressures, in which one force largely negates the effect of the 
other, as well as cases of complementary selection where the forces combine and 
potentially result in a larger response than from either alone. 
Sober and Wilson (1998) outlined three steps for assessing the dynamics of 
selection in a multilevel case, though they focused on just two levels of selection: the 
group-level and the organismal-level. First,  “determine  what  would  evolve  if  group  
selection  were  the  only  evolutionary  force”  (Sober  and  Wilson  1998:103).  Next,  
“determine  what  would  evolve  if  individual  [organismal] selection were the only 
evolutionary  force”  (Sober  and  Wilson  1998:103).  Finally,  “examine  the  basic  
ingredients  of  natural  selection  at  each  level”  (Sober  and  Wilson  1998:104);;  that  is,  the  
phenotypic variation, the heritability of that variation, and the differences in survival and 
reproduction that are caused by that variation. 
For other examples of this approach, see Okasha (2006), who provides a sweeping 
review of the conceptual framework for multilevel selection including theory, tools, and 
ongoing disputes from both biological and philosophical literature. 
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It  is  also  worth  noting  here  that  Brandon’s  (1990)  “screening  off”  method  could  
be used instead as a means of testing whether selection in a particular system is working 
at multiple levels of organization. Though Brandon originally intended it to help identify 
the particular level at which selecting is working, if knowledge about two or more levels 
is required to predict the final outcome this would serve as evidence that selection is 
working synergistically across levels simultaneously.  
 
Empirical, single level 
Goals and questions: This approach is best represented by researchers 
conducting experimental studies, either in the laboratory or the field, focused on 
questions such as whether a particular level is capable of responding to artificial selection 
at that level, or whether selection at a particular level is driving the evolution of a trait in 
question. This approach also includes questions about whether a system is better 
described as being driven by, for example, group-level selection or organismal-level 
selection. As such, these questions deal with particular systems or organisms and, though 
the authors may conclude with possible generalizations of their work, these projects 
initially begin with experimental or observational questions. 
Methods and examples: Statistical methods that provide the ability to judge 
whether or not a response to group selection was seen in experimental and observational 
data typify many of these studies. Some of the methods used include analyses of variance 
(ANOVAs), mixed-effects models, and Monte Carlo simulations (Baer et al. 2000; 
Swenson et al. 2000a, 2000b; Lively and Bashey 2009). 
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Examples  of  this  approach  include  Goodnight’s  (1985)  experiment  using  the  cress  
Arabidopsis that tested if groups of plants would respond to group-level selection for 
increased total leaf cover, Baer et al.’s  (2000)  experiment  that  tested  if  populations  of fish 
would respond to group-level selection for increased or decreased population size, and 
Lively  and  Bashey’s  (2009)  experiment  with  nematodes  that  was  designed  to  test  if  
populations of nematodes would respond to group-level selection for increased or 
decreased population size. 
Swenson et al. (2000a, 2000b) provided two examples of this approach studying 
levels other than the group, with separate experiments using unidentified soil 
communities to test if entire communities would respond to selection for increased or 
decreased environmental PH, promotion or inhibition of plant growth, or ability to 
degrade toxic compounds (3-chloroaniline). 
 
Empirical, multilevel 
Goals and questions: This approach is used by researchers conducting 
experimental studies, either in the laboratory or the field, focused on questions related to 
the interaction of selection acting across levels. This includes studies that explicitly 
incorporate a component addressing the interaction among two or more levels in relation 
to the total response to selection. This approach also includes questions about how 
conflicting selection at two or more levels might result in a lessened response than 
otherwise expected, or how selection at two or more levels might combine to result in a 
greater response than would be seen by selection at either level alone.  
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Methods and examples: The empirical, multilevel approach often relies upon 
statistical methods that provide the potential for decomposing the total variance of a 
response to selection into components from multiple levels. For instance, these methods 
allow a researcher to assess how much of a given response was due to a change at the 
group-level and how much was due to a change at the organismal-level. The first of these 
methods was pioneered by George Price, who realized that the mathematical model he 
created, now called the Price Equation (Price 1970), allowed for the decomposition of 
variation among generations, and also among levels of organization (Hamilton 1996). 
Another method growing in popularity is that of contextual analysis, which started as a 
tool from the social sciences where it was used to explore how a group-level variable 
could explain variation in individual behaviors (Boyd and Iversen 1979). For example, if 
considering the voting preferences of individuals, in which individual-level variables 
such as age or sex have an influence on a particular  individual’s  preferences, the average 
voting decisions of the neighborhood (= group level) within which the individual lives 
might also influence his or her ultimate voting decisions (Boyd and Iversen 1979). For a 
comparison of contextual analysis with the Price Equation, see Okasha (2004b, 2006). 
Another example of this approach is Wade’s  (1976,  1977)  work on group-level 
selection in flour beetles. Wade included a treatment and control to allow for analysis of 
two conflicting levels by setting organismal-level selection for increased population size 
against group-level selection for decreased population size, as well as complementary 
levels of selection by setting organismal-level selection for increased population size 
against group-level selection for increased population size. Goodnight et al. (1992) 
provide an example of how the same researcher(s) can use more than one approach, as 
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Goodnight et al. (1992) reanalyzed Goodnight’s  (1985)  data  in  order  to  illustrate  the  
benefits of contextual analysis. Another example of mechanistic explanations for group-
level selection is Amdam  and  Page’s (2010) work on honeybees. They describe the 
results of an ongoing series of studies that started by selecting on beehives for increased 
and decreased pollen storage, including the follow-up studies that tracked the responses 
at the level of the hive, as well as the behavioral, physiological, and developmental 
changes in the foraging females that produced the hive-level responses (see also, Page 
and Amdam 2007; Page and Fondrk 1995) 
 
Others 
The four approaches discussed above are the extreme examples created by the 
intersection of the two continua I have described. Many researchers work somewhere 
between the two ends of theoretical and empirical, but remained interested in a single 
level of analysis. For example, Wynne-Edwards (1964) and Lack (1966) were both 
interested in theory creation but were motivated by, and heavily grounded in 
observations. A similar example is Damuth and Heisler (1987), who advocated the use of 
contextual analysis in multilevel selection, despite the fact that they did not conduct novel 
experimental studies themselves. 
Another kind of research that falls somewhere between the approaches I described 
above is that of researchers who largely rely upon agent based models for multilevel 
research. Some of these fall within the focal level end of the continuum, such as those 
exploring how organismal-level rules of behavior can result in emergent and heritable 
properties of the group (for examples, see Miller and Page 2007). Others fall more to the 
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multilevel end of the continuum by using agent based models to explore the dynamics of 
selection acting upon multiple traits at multiple levels (for examples, see Miller and Page 
2007). Indeed, in recent years some modelers have even taken to recreating, in agent 
based models, some of the disputed verbal models of the past such as Wynne-Edwards’s  
(1962) thesis described in chapter 2. Among these, Werfel and Bar-Yam (2004) 
demonstrated that there are conditions under which the group selection envisioned by 
Wynne-Edwards (1962) can indeed result in the maintenance of group-beneficial traits, a 
conclusion also supported by experimental evidence (e.g., Kerr et al. 2006). Agent based 
models have also been used by researchers studying human behavior, including how 
particular patterns of individual decision making can result in group-beneficial outcomes 
(see Boyd and Richerson 2005; Henrich and Henrich 2007).  
 
Interpretation of Experimental Data 
As a demonstration of the conflicting interpretations that can result from the 
different approaches described above, I now turn to a description of a single experiment 
and the potential interpretations that arise from each of the approaches. 
Overview of the Nasonia experiment in chapter 1: Recall that the group 
selection treatment included a collective context of five wasps housed together followed 
by a solitary context of each wasp housed separately. The organismal selection treatment 
included a solitary context in which each wasp was housed separately followed by a 
collective context in which the wasps were placed in groups of five.  
In the group selection treatment, the group context did not show a response to 
selection for increased population size, while the solitary context did show a response. 
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Within the organismal selection treatment, there was a response to selection in the 
solitary context, but not in the group context. 
Theoretical, single level interpretation: The theoretical, single level approach 
might  rely  upon  “screening  off”  to identify whether group-level selection was at work in 
the Nasonia experiment, which would require that population size at the group-level 
screened off the fecundity at the organismal level. However, in describing how to apply 
screening off, Brandon (1990) explicitly argued that population size was an inappropriate 
group-level character because it should be interpreted as an aggregate of individual 
fitness.  Thus,  based  on  Brandon’s  description,  the  Nasonia experiment would be 
interpreted as simply showing organismal selection in two separate environmental 
contexts: the solitary context and the collective context. 
Another possible interpretation from the theoretical, single level approach might 
be to conclude that because the groups in the Nasonia experiment did not respond to what 
I called group-level selection, but the females in the solitary context of the group-
selection treatment did, it is possible that what I called group-level selection was actually 
indirect selection for an organismal trait (Okasha 2006) or what Sober (1984) would call 
“selection  for” as  opposed  to  selection  “selection  of.” That is, the trait that I thought I was 
selecting upon at the group level was actually not directly connected to organismal 
fitness, but was correlated with a trait at the organismal level that did respond to the 
selection treatment. 
Theoretical, multilevel interpretation: This approach is largely concerned with 
how to conceptualize selection operating at multiple levels, so there are few analytical 
tools that apply to empirical cases. Those that have been mentioned or advocated are 
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usually contextual analysis or the Price equation. Unfortunately, because the organismal 
fitness proxy within the group selection treatment failed to provide appropriate proxies 
for organismal contribution to group fitness, the contextual analysis component was 
removed from the experiment. This also means that the Price equation would not be 
appropriate for use in the analysis, and so the theoretical, multilevel approach would not 
be able to apply either of these analytical tools. Instead, a researcher using this approach 
might rely upon the general description provided by Sober and Wilson (1998) to guide 
the analysis, though because this method was intended for approaching an adaptation 
with no prior knowledge of the selection processes that led to its creation, its application 
to experimental data might be awkward. 
It is also important to note that many researchers using this approach advocate a 
plurality of conceptual tools, such as both multilevel selection and inclusive fitness 
models. This leaves the possibility of a plurality of interpretations each being considered 
for a single set of data. For instance, such a plurality might include the single level 
interpretation that the wasps in the experiment are responding to the presence of other 
females and adjusting their clutch sizes to maximize organismal fitness—an argument 
similar  to  Lack’s  (1966)  interpretations—while also accepting a multilevel interpretation 
that groups of wasps do not interact in ways that lead to a heritable group-level trait for 
population size. 
In regard to this second point, this experiment could be viewed as consistent with 
Wilson’s  trait  group  models  (e.g.  Wilson  1975),  in  which  the  interactions of the 
individuals within the collective vials make them valid groups for the trait of population 
size. This would mean that the potential for selection was present even if there were no 
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response to population size observed as a result. However, such a view would use the 
experimental data to track the influence of group membership on organismal fitness in an 
MLS1 analysis, whereas the analysis of the Nasonia experiment described in chapter 1 
focused on an MLS2 analysis, tracking the fitness of entire groups. 
Empirical, single level interpretation: This approach generally is used to test if 
an experimental treatment responded to group-level selection. Thus, this approach would 
accept or reject the Nasonia experimental data as demonstrating a response to group 
selection based on the statistical significance of the results. An important point to note 
here is that both empirical approaches would accept that group selection was present if it 
were part of the experimental design. The experiment would then provide the data 
necessary to determine if there were a statistical response to the artificial selection that 
the experiment imposed. 
In the case of the Nasonia data, the experimental design was intended to create 
circumstances favoring group-level selection for increased number of offspring per 
standardized host. However, an analysis of the data did not detect a statistically 
significant difference between the initial number of offspring per host and the number of 
offspring per host after the experiment. Thus, this approach would conclude that group-
level selection was present in the experimental treatment, but that it did not lead to a 
response under the conditions of the experiment. 
Empirical, multilevel interpretation: This empirical approach would also accept 
that group-level selection was present if the experiment were designed to exert selection 
at the group level. In the Nasonia experiment, this would be a treatment for group 
selection and a treatment for organismal selection. Rather than focusing on whether 
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selection was present, the interest of this approach would be in determining the response, 
if any, and how much of that response might be attributed to selection acting at different 
levels.  
The Nasonia experiment was designed with a component that would have allowed 
for the use of contextual analysis by providing a proxy for organismal fitness despite the 
fact that the fitness of each wasp was unavailable for this experiment. This proxy is 
important because contextual analysis requires both organismal and group fitness in order 
to decompose the variance. However, the contextual analysis component of the Nasonia 
experiment was subsequently dropped because the wasps behaved in very different ways 
in the proxy condition than they did in the group conditions, making the proxy a poor 
indicator of actual organismal contribution to group fitness. 
Despite the lack of contextual analysis, researchers using the data driven, 
multilevel approach would likely notice the variations observed in the group selection 
treatment. In particular, there was a statistically significant difference in number of 
offspring per host between the beginning and ending of the experiment within the group 
treatment when the females were moved into the solitary context so that each had a vial 
separate from other wasps. In other words, despite the lack of response to group-level 
selection when the wasps were housed in groups, one interpretation is that there was a 
response to group-level selection on the wasps when they were then transferred to 
solitary context vials.  
 
 
 
  99 
Conflicting Interpretations  
In this section I will first discuss some conflicting interpretations that can arise 
between the approaches described above. Then, I turn to conflicts that can exist even 
within the same approach. Finally, I address some of the causes for these conflicts, 
including differences in both methods and epistemology.  
Conflicting interpretations between approaches: Even with the very same 
experimental design and results, the different approaches I have described might well 
lead researchers to different interpretations of experimental data. Two of the most 
extreme differences are in the theoretical, single level and in the empirical, multilevel.  
As I described above, the theoretical, single level approach supports an 
interpretation of the Nasonia experiment as demonstrating that no group selection had 
occurred, and some might use such a conclusion as evidence that group-level selection is 
not an important force for evolution. Indeed, it is worth mentioning again that Brandon 
(1990) argued that “population size”  was not a legitimate group-level trait because the 
size of a population would only be an aggregate of the organisms’  offspring. This, of 
course is in direct contrast with many of the experimental studies of group-level 
selection, including those from both the empirical, single level approach and the 
empirical, multilevel approach. In many of those studies, population size is taken to be an 
emergent trait that is only present within an entire population because no single 
individual can be said to possess the character “population size.” Additionally, in any 
case where individuals change their fitness-relevant behavior as a result of group 
membership, the total population size will be an emergent character of the interactions 
within the  population.  It  is  also  interesting  to  note  that,  despite  Brandon’s (1990) 
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argument that population size is not a legitimate group-level trait, Brandon (1990) 
highlighted  Wade’s  (1977) work as representing an experimental demonstration of group-
level selection. 
Furthermore, some researchers using the theoretical, single level approach might 
argue that because the groups in the Nasonia experiment did not respond to group-level 
selection, but the number of offspring per host of the solitary wasps did change in both 
treatments, the experiment is actually a demonstration of the importance of organismal-
level selection in various contexts. They might add to this that the experiment also 
demonstrated that the apparent group-level traits under study were really only the result 
of indirect selection on organismal traits.  
However, researchers from the empirical, multilevel approach—while, I presume, 
disappointed that the experiment did not successfully include a covariance analysis—
might still interpret the change in number of offspring per host within the solitary context 
of the group selection treatment as representing a response at the organismal-level to 
group-level selection. Such a conclusion would be in contrast with the single level 
approaches, which often stipulate that responses and adaptations to selection can only 
occur at the level at which selection is acting.  
Recall that the types of questions asked by the single level approaches are often 
concerned with the evolution of a particular trait. Indeed, some of the arguments from the 
theoretical, single level approach are built around a researcher identifying the particular 
trait that selection is acting upon before constructing an explanation for why that trait is 
an adaptation. But many of the multilevel studies involve multiple traits spread across 
two or more levels of organization because the interest is in understanding selection 
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acting at multiple levels simultaneously. As such, a theoretical, single level researcher 
might find the interpretations of an empirical, data driven researcher to be entirely 
unsatisfactory. For example, Lieberman and Verba (1995) argued: 
Wade [1977] and Wilson [1977] identified cases of group selection that 
we classify as cases of group sorting and/or context dependence, because 
in their examples the sorting of groups was either caused by properties of 
organisms or the groups were not even sorted but organisms were affected 
by their group membership (Mustapha Mond sorting, according to Vrba 
1989). Cases of group sorting only equate with group selection if there are 
emergent group characters and if their presence leads to differential group 
birth and/or death rates. (Lieberman and Vrba 1995:395) 
 
In other words, because these experiments included responses in traits at multiple levels, 
Lieberman and Vrba did not consider them to be representing true group-level selection. 
Also note that Lieberman and Vrba are implicitly arguing that the only group-level 
selection that they accept is that of MLS2, since they require differences in birth or death 
rates of the groups.  
As another example of conflict caused by different approaches with respect to the 
level that is the focus of the research, consider the debate discussed in chapter 2 between 
West et al. (2007, 2008) and Wilson (2008).  Though  I  used  Wilson’s  (1975)  early  
discussions of trait-group models as an example of the theoretical, single level approach, 
much of Wilson’s  later  work  fits the theoretical, multilevel approach because the 
questions moved from whether trait-groups can serve as a level of selection to how 
selection acting at the organismal level as well as the trait-group level might 
simultaneously influence evolution of organisms. Thus, Wilson (2008) seems most 
interested in questions about how the group membership can influence organismal 
fitness. In contrast, West et al. (2007, 2008), advocating kin selection, seem more 
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interested in questions that fit with a theoretical, single level approach. Their arguments 
in favor of kin selection suggest that their questions and goals are focused on the 
organismal level and how behavioral traits can influence related organisms.  
In summary, many conflicts can arise between these different approaches, 
including conflicting interpretations of the same data. Indeed, these differences can even 
lead to cases where the same data are used by opponents in a single debate, with each 
arguing that the data support his or her own position (e.g., Wynne-Edwards 1962; Lack 
1954, 1966). The differences in interpretation among these approaches are further 
exacerbated by the fact that the type of evidence that one approach finds strongly 
supporting an argument might to another approach seem completely irrelevant. These two 
points suggest an explanation for why the addition of new data has not resolved the 
overall controversy or particular conflicts. 
Conflicting interpretations within approaches: Even the approaches that I have 
described above do not fully capture the nuance of interpreting data and I fully expect 
that researchers using the same approach might reach different interpretations contingent 
upon how their approach intersects with their interests in MLS1 or MLS2. As another 
example of how approaches can influence data interpretation, reconsider the pair of 
similar experiments that I mentioned in chapter 1: Baer et al. (2000) and Bashey and 
Lively (2009). 
Baer et al. (2000) selected on total population size with the live bearing fish 
Heterandria formosa, in which neither source population showed a statistically 
significant response in either increased or decreased population treatments. Specifically, 
Baer et al. started with two source populations and two selection treatments (high and 
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low) for population size. They placed 15 males and 15 females in each of four replicate 
tanks for each source population and treatment, and then counted the census size after six 
weeks. At this point, they identified the two tanks with the highest (or lowest) 
populations and then equally distributed those fish into the four tanks of the next 
“generation” in proportion to their class: males, females, and juveniles. For example, if 
the two highest tanks contained 8 males and 10 males respectively, then they would 
distribute  4  males  into  each  of  the  next  generation’s  tanks.  After  six  rounds  of  selection— 
or what they called six generations—Baer et al. counted the final population sizes and 
compared these with the initial population sizes, concluding that there was no significant 
response to selection in any of the populations. 
Bashey and Lively (2009), studying the endopathic nematode Steinernema 
carpocapsae, selected on increased emergence of nematodes per host. They ran a similar 
experiment with three populations derived from a single mixed stock, and of the three 
populations only one showed a response to selection on the group level character of 
number of nematodes emerged from the host after 14 days. Specifically, Bashey and 
Lively performed selection on increased and decreased emergence rate from hosts, using 
five replicate lines for each treatment type in each of the three experiments they 
performed, and each line consisted of 20 hosts. The life cycle of parasitic nematodes 
involves multiple adults infecting a single host, mating inside the host, and then a single 
generation of offspring emerge. Thus, host caterpillars were infected with approximately 
15 nematodes in 0.5mL of deionized water. Bashey and Lively estimated that under the 
conditions of the experiment, approximately 50% of these nematodes survived to 
reproduce within the host. After 7-14 days, the offspring began to emerge from the hosts 
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and after 14 days the number of nematodes were counted and then selection was 
performed based on the number of emerged nematodes standardized by host mass. These 
nematodes were then used to infect the next 20 hosts of that line. This was repeated for 4 
rounds of selection. Bashey and Lively then compared the number of nematodes 
emerging in the high-line with those in the low-line of each experiment, and determined 
that only in experiment 1 were the two treatments significantly different, concluding that 
there was a response to selection only in the population used for experiment 1. 
Notice that of these two experiments, the nematode experiment is the most similar 
to the Nasonia experiment, partly as a result of each being built around a parasitic 
species. Even so, both the fish and the nematode experiments included high and low 
lines, selecting for increased and decreased population sizes respectively, as well as 
relying upon differential extinction of groups to create the selection gradient.  
However, the Baer et al. (2000) study differed from the Bashey  and  Lively’s  
(2009) nematode experiment—and the Nasonia experiment—in key respects. For 
instance, as mentioned in chapter 1, both the nematode experiments and my Nasonia 
experiments used propagule pools for creating subsequent generations while the fish 
experiment used migrant pools. This means that for each generation in the Nasonia 
experiment the largest population of five was the only one that created offspring, and in 
the nematode experiment it was the largest of 20, whereas in the fish experiment the 
experimenters merged offspring from the two largest of the four tanks. As mentioned 
previously, migrant pools disrupt the population structure, but this method for selection 
also resulted in a lower selection gradient since only fifty percent of the populations went 
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extinct without contributing to the next generation as compared with eighty percent in the 
Nasonia experiment.  
The differences between the use of MLS1 and MLS2 are also implicit in these 
accounts. Bashey and Lively (2009) used MLS2, demonstrated by their interest in how 
entire groups responded. Baer et al. (2000) were interested in MLS1, as is clear from the 
way that Baer et al.’s  experiment  focused  on  the  fish  used  in  the  groups,  rather  than  the  
group properties themselves. For instance, the fish in a selected group were moved from 
one “generation” to another, leading Baer et al. to call their experiment one with 
“overlapping  generations.”  However,  notice  that  the  group  generations  did  not  overlap.  
Rather, the overlap of generations only applied to the organisms within the groups. Thus, 
in order to be considered overlapping generations, the interest must have been on the fish 
themselves rather than the groups of fish. This interest in the organismal-level is also 
clear in their choice of a migrant pool rather than a propagule pool so as to avoid 
inbreeding, as mentioned in chapter 1.  
Finally, the conclusions of these two experiments differed greatly, which was 
partly influenced by the shared approaches, but was also influenced by differences in the 
aims of the experiments and what they were tracking—that is, group membership 
influencing organismal fitness sensu MLS1 or group fitness via group reproduction sensu 
MLS2—despite the fact that they used the same approach. Bashey and Lively (2009) 
found that two of the three experiments did not respond to group-level selection, but in 
their conclusion they focused on the possible explanations for why the one population 
responded when the other two did not. Thus, their tone was supportive of group-level 
selection as a process, and understanding the conditions under which group-
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selection might lead to a response. In contrast, Baer et al. (2000) did not find a response 
and concluded that group-level selection must necessarily be a weak force that would 
rarely occur. They did not discuss possible explanations, including the possibility that the 
conditions of their experiment accounted for their results and conclusions, as the design 
was not favorable for the type of between-group variation that group-level selection is 
most likely to act upon. 
Conflicting methodology and epistemology: In addition to the conflicting 
interpretations described above, conflicts can also arise as a result of the particular 
concepts, definitions, and assumptions used by different approaches. For example, 
consider  Maynard  Smith’s  (1964)  haystack  model  that  was  designed  as  a  critique  of  
Wynne-Edwards’s (1962) group selection thesis. Maynard Smith used the restrictive 
conditions under which the haystack model could work to argue that the conditions 
necessary for group-level selection to occur were so rare that it would never be an 
important force in nature. But Wynne-Edwards (1964) replied with an argument that 
Maynard  Smith’s  model  was  too  abstract:   
The model of the mice in the haystacks is not, perhaps, a sufficiently close 
approximation to any natural situation to help us far towards a solution. A 
realistic counterpart might be, for example, the woodlice (Porcellio 
scaber) that fed on the green alga Protococcus living on tree-trunks 
studied by Brereton [1957]; marked woodlice confined their feeding to 
their own particular tree, and the population appeared to be subdivided 
thus into breeding units. Had any of the latter increased too freely they 
could have exterminated their stock of this particular food plant, which 
does not regenerate easily. (Wynne-Edwards 1964:1147) 
 
Notice that, in essence, Wynne-Edwards disagreed with the assumptions built into the 
way  that  Maynard  Smith’s  haystack  model  defined  “group”  and  argued  instead  for  a  
more biologically realistic example, in which case he argued that his (1962) thesis of 
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group selection as a result of differential extinction could indeed work in natural 
populations. 
However, Wynne-Edwards (1964) also acknowledged that there was a deeper 
conflict between his views and those of Maynard Smith:  
The major obstacle to the constructive discussion between us really arises 
from the understandable (though regrettable) differences in outlook and 
experiences between a laboratory geneticist and a field ecologist. To me 
his picture of the territorial systems and other aspects of conventional 
behaviour appears scarcely true or comprehensive enough to provide a 
basis for valid deduction; my own grasp of the genetical theory of natural 
selection, on the other hand, no doubt looks still more halting and inept to 
him. We ought to enlarge the area of common ground, but that is too big a 
task to discharge effectively here. (Wynne-Edwards 1964:1147).  
 
This  difference  in  “outlook  and  experiences”  suggests  that  Wynne-Edwards was really 
highlighting the fact that he and Maynard Smith disagreed not only on the specific 
definitions and assumptions used in their models but also on deeper epistemological 
issues at stake. 
Wynne-Edwards was not the only one to express such concerns about the 
definitions, assumptions, or concepts used by others. Maynard Smith (1998:217) shared 
in an interview his own complaints regarding the group selection discussions of the 1970s 
and 1980s: 
Hamilton, myself, Dawkins and so on were all thinking in terms of gene 
frequencies and the sort of Haldane-Fisher type models that we were used 
to. The people in the States who took up the problem, tended to formulate 
it in terms of variance-covariance matrices and things of this kind, much 
more  analogous  to  classical  thermodynamics.  You  couldn’t  see  the  genes  
for the variances. I have to say that I find this stuff impenetrable, in much 
the same way that I find classical thermodynamics impenetrable. I can use 
it  for  working  out  a  steam  engine’s  behaviour  but  I  don’t  understand  it;;  it  
doesn’t  give  me  an  insight  into  what  I  think  is  going  to  happen next. 
(Maynard Smith 1998:217) 
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Notice  here  that  Maynard  Smith’s  argument is not that the co-variance methods were 
inadequate or improper. Rather, he argued that they were not useful to his way of 
understanding the world. Of course, Maynard Smith disagreed about more than simply 
the co-variance  methods  used  by  the  “new”  researchers during the late 1970s and 1980s: 
By 1975, individual selection had become the orthodoxy, and a lapse into 
group selection was liable to be met with hatred, ridicule and contempt. In 
science, however, it seems that the establishment of an orthodoxy is the 
signal for attempts to undermine it. These have come from two 
directions—attempts to re-establish the role of selection at levels above 
the individual, and attempts to replace individual by gene selection. 
(Maynard Smith, 1998:206) 
 
Unfortunately, they [group selection researchers after 1975] used all the 
words we had been using but in totally different senses. So  the  term  ‘group  
selection’  that had a perfectly clear meaning in the debates in Britain 
between 1961 and 1975, was used in a completely different sense between 
1975 and 1985 by young people in America, which was a damn nuisance. 
We had to go over all sorts of old vomit again. (Maynard Smith 1998:217) 
 
Thus, Maynard Smith had two distinct complaints about the group selection discussion of 
the late 1970s and early 1990s: 1) he disliked the application of covariance equations to 
the  discussions  of  group  selection  and  2)  he  considered  the  debate  settled  until  “young  
people  in  America”  started  it  again  using  new  definitions  for  existing  terms – specifically, 
as, seen in chapters 1 and 2,  the  new  definition  of  “group”  used  by  intradermic  group  
selection models. 
Of course, as I suggest in chapter 1 and discuss in chapter 2, even during the times 
that Maynard Smith mentioned there were different usages of the “perfectly  clear”  
meaning  for  words  like  “group.”  Some  of  these  confusions  were not sorted out until the 
late 1980s—such as the difference between group selection of the MLS1 or MLS2 
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varieties described by Heisler and Damuth (1988)—while others, like variations in the 
definition  of  “group,”  remain  even  now. 
Equally, conflicts caused by different worldviews have remained. For instance, 
Dawkins (1994), in responding to Sober and Wilson (1994) wrote: 
Wilson  &  Sober’s  passion  is  obviously genuine. I welcome their plainly 
sincere attempt at clarification and, despite myself, I quite enjoy the 
rhetoric. They are zealots, baffled by the failure of the rest of us to agree 
with them. I can sympathize: I remain reciprocally baffled by what I see as 
the sheer, wanton, head-in-bag perversity of the position that they 
champion. (Dawkins 1994:616-617) 
 
Indeed, this observation seems to apply to other disputes over multilevel selection, 
including the disagreement described earlier between West et al. (2006, 2008) and 
Wilson (2008). Again, the heart of these arguments is not experimental data or particular 
interpretations; these disputes are about how satisfactory the concept of multilevel 
selection is when compared with the concept of inclusive fitness. In this regard, the 
opponents of multilevel selection, including Dawkins and West et al. seem to share 
Maynard  Smith’s  views  that multilevel selection does not provide an advantage for 
understanding natural selection:  
The question of whether there is a group selection or not is a question of 
the nature of the world. Whether or not you should use inclusive fitness or 
gene-centered  models  is  not  a  question  of  what  the  world  is  like,  it’s  a  
question about what is a convenient way of modeling it. (Maynard Smith, 
1998:214) 
 
 
Conclusion 
The role of data: Brandon (1994), discussing the relationship between theory and 
experiments, argued:  
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Wade's [1977] laboratory demonstrations of the effectiveness of group 
selection were extremely important and are certainly to be commended. 
But they have only gone a short way toward resolving the controversy 
concerning group selection; they have not convinced any skeptics of the 
importance of group selection in nature. For that, one needs experiments 
under more 'natural' conditions: one needs field work. (Brandon 1994:68) 
 
I agree with Brandon that the experimental data seem to have done little to change the 
views of those who oppose multilevel selection. However, given what I have described 
above regarding the alternative interpretations of laboratory experiments resulting from 
different approaches to multilevel selection, I would argue that the addition of new 
studies—field-based or otherwise—will affect the ongoing theoretical arguments little 
more than those that have already been published.  
The reason for this lies in the nature of the conflicts at the heart of these disputes. 
Okasha (2006) captured an important part of this relationship between data and theory 
when he wrote in his review of multilevel selection: 
Obviously, empirical data is crucial for resolving the levels-of-selection 
question, as for all scientific questions; but conceptual clarity is a 
prerequisite too. Unless we can agree on what it means for there to be 
selection at a given hierarchical level, on what the criteria for 
individuating  ‘levels’  are,  on  whether  selection  at  one  level  can  ever  be  
‘reduced’  to  selection  at  another,  on  how  multi-level selection should be 
modeled,  and  on  whether  there  is  always  ‘one  true  fact’  about  the  level(s)  
at which selection is acting, then there is little prospect of empirical 
resolution, however much data we collect. (Okasha 2006:2) 
 
I argue that most of the debates regarding both group selection and multilevel selection 
are not about data. Instead, they are the product of conflicting views of, as Maynard 
Smith  called  it,  the  “nature  of  the  world”  specifically, the evolutionary process and what 
entities are subject to it. To this end, data are and will continue to be essential. But it is 
not data alone that the debates of the past or present hinge upon, so the addition of new 
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data will not in and of itself help to resolve the controversy. Instead, dialogue about 
researchers’  views  regarding the nature of the world might be necessary in addition to 
adding more biologically relevant data. 
Approaches and debates: In chapter 2 I argued that the history of group 
selection, and now multilevel selection, is best viewed as a series of interrelated debates 
about specific topics rather than as a single continuous history. Here, I have described 
multiple approaches to the study of multilevel selection that also help account for the 
ongoing controversy. Although these approaches share a general subject, understanding 
multilevel selection, the particular ways that researchers frame their questions, the 
general methods that they use, and even the definitions of the concepts that they depend 
upon can vary from approach to approach, leading to the potential for quite varied 
interpretations with respect to both data and theory. However, the conflicts resulting from 
the different approaches are not insurmountable. By recognizing that different approaches 
can have different explanatory goals, researchers might not judge the work of others with 
the assumption that what they seek to explain is the same. Instead, theoreticians, 
philosophers and experimentalists should all describe what they take their work to assist 
in explaining. Finally, when necessary, researchers should give greater voice to the 
epistemology motivating their work rather than only discussing the theory and data that 
are built upon the—often-unmentioned—worldviews. 
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CONCLUSION 
The notion that natural selection might act at levels of biological organization 
other than only those of organisms or their genes has a long history including both 
theoretical and empirical analysis. But controversy remains despite more than six decades 
of study and I have explored in several ways why this controversy has continued for one 
particular case of multilevel selection: groups as a level at which natural selection may or 
may not operate effectively. In doing so, my research illustrated the role that conceptual 
change has played in the controversy about group-level selection over the past sixty 
years.  I argue that conceptual clarity as well as empirical evidence are necessary to 
resolve the controversy. 
The experimental work described in the first chapter demonstrated that the 
interpretation of experimental results can be confounded by the multiplicity of implicit 
definitions  for  the  term  “group.”  The  historical  analysis  in  the  second  chapter  provided  a  
review of modern multilevel selection theory by demonstrating the ways in which the 
debates about levels of selection have and have not changed. I also showed that the 
aspects of the debates that have changed the most are those related to the theoretical 
content and empirical data available, while disputes related to methods remain largely 
unchanged. In the second chapter I argued that the history of the group selection 
controversy is best interpreted as multiple, interrelated debates rather than a single 
continuous debate. Finally, my synthetic analysis built upon the experimental and 
historical work to provide a framework for understanding the ongoing disputes about 
group selection, and multilevel selection more generally. In particular, I argued that there 
are  different  “approaches”  to  the  study  of  multilevel  selection  distinguished  by  where  the  
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research falls upon two axes: 1) whether the researcher is primarily interested in a single 
level of organization or multiple levels, and 2) the extent to which the work starts from a 
theoretical  or  empirical  perspective.  I  described  four  such  “approaches”  and  discussed  
how these approaches might lead to conflicting interpretations of the Nasonia 
experimental data from chapter one. 
The lessons to be learned from this project are varied, as are the potential for 
avenues of future research. Indeed, there are lessons to be learned not only for those 
studying the topic of multilevel selection, but also lessons for historians of biology and 
lessons that might apply broadly to  controversies in the sciences beyond the biological.  
For the empiricists and theoreticians studying multilevel selection this project 
brings to light the often undiscussed challenges involved in designing experiments to 
address questions within the subject of multilevel selection. These challenges partly arise 
from the fact that the theoretical arguments for how to test multilevel selection cases are 
rarely presented in a way that is easily applied to an experimental system, leaving a 
separation between the theoretical and experimental explorations of the subject. One of 
the  clear  consequences,  and  challenges,  is  that  what  counts  as  a  “group”  varies  
conceptually among investigators; yet, researchers often take the definition that they use 
to be self-evident. Thus, future work should focus on providing conceptual clarity, while 
also integrating the experimental and theoretical work that has been done within the 
subject of multilevel selection. It is also worth reiterating here that continuing research on 
multilevel selection—in particular the two questions of 1) under what circumstances we 
should expect to see selection operating at one level of selection or another, and 2) how 
selection working across multiple levels of organization simultaneously will result in a 
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single response—will continue to be of importance beyond biology because these 
biological concepts are used as models for understanding selection acting on complex 
adaptive systems both biological and otherwise. Indeed, in the future both biologists and 
philosophers of biology could add much to the growing science studying complex 
adaptive systems. Equally, there might be generalizable lessons learned from this work 
that would continue to benefit work on biological multilevel selection, as I believe is 
exemplified by the work of some anthropologists in using multilevel selection, and 
group-level selection in particular, to understand cultural evolution (e.g., Boyd and 
Richerson 1985, 2005; Richerson and Boyd 2005; Henrich and Henrich 2007).  
For historians of biology, I have provided some new material, as despite the fact 
that the study of multilevel selection has been named as such since the late 1980s, to my 
knowledge there has not yet been a comprehensive review/history of the ideas behind 
multilevel selection. Histories and reviews of group-level selection capture some of the 
research and ideas leading to what became multilevel selection, yet fail to capture 
important elements such as the work on whether species could serve as levels of selection 
and discussions of community-level selection. Detailed histories exploring the extent to 
which  these  subjects  overlapped  before  the  coining  of  the  phrase  “multilevel  selection”  
would benefit future work by providing the grounding out of which the current multilevel 
selection questions arose and by further illustrating the role of conceptual change in these 
discussions. I also hope that my work has provided another example of the usefulness of 
tracking conceptual change in order to understand both the current state of a subject, as 
well as understanding any controversy associated with the subject.  
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Finally, it is this last suggestion that might well apply to fields of research beyond 
the biological sciences. If tracking the role of conceptual change in promoting or 
exacerbating ongoing controversy within a field of science provides some means of better 
understanding that controversy, and thereby suggesting avenues by which the controversy 
might be alleviated, then this project could serve as one such example of how this might 
be applied to other areas of research. In particular, this project suggests that other 
controversies might well be continued as a result of changes in the ways that particular 
concepts are operationally defined or as a consequence of researchers holding, what 
Maynard Smith referred to as, conflicting  “world  views.”  In  either  of  these  cases,  it  is  
only by acknowledging the conflicting definitions or world views and then providing 
operational definitions—in effect, adding conceptual clarity—that such controversy will 
be resolved.  
 
 
  116 
REFERENCES 
Abbot, P., J. Abe, J. Alcock, S. Alizon, J.A.C. Alpedrinha, M. Andersson, J. Andre, M. 
van Baalen, F. Balloux, S. Balshine, N. Barton, L.W. Beukeboom, J.M. 
Biernaskie, T. Bilde, G. Borgia, M. Breed, S. Brown, R. Bshary, A. Buckling, N.T. 
Burley, M.N. Burton-Chellew, M.A. Cant, M. Chapuisat, E.L. Charnov, T. 
Clutton-Brock, A. Cockburn, B.J. Cole, N. Colegrave, L. Cosmides, I.D. Couzin, 
J.A. Coyne, S. Creel, B. Crespi, R.L. Curry, S.R.X. Dall, T. Day, J.L. Dickinson, 
L.A. Dugatkin, C. E. Mouden, S.T. Emlen, J. Evans, R. Ferriere, J. Field, S. 
Foitzik, K. Foster, W.A. Foster, C.W. Fox, J. Gadau, S. Gandon, A. Gardner, M.G. 
Gardner, T. Getty, M.A.D. Goodisman, A. Grafen, R. Grosberg, C.M. Grozinger,  
P. Gouyon, D. Gwynne, P.H. Harvey, B.J. Hatchwell, J. Heinze, H. Helantera, 
K.R. Helms, K. Hill, N. Jiricny, R.A. Johnstone, A. Kacelnik, E.T. Kiers, H. 
Kokko, J. Komdeur, J. Korb, D. Kronauer, R. Kümmerli, L. Lehmann, T.A. 
Linksvayer, S. Lion, B. Lyon, J.A.R. Marshall, R. McElreath, Y. Michalakis, R.E. 
Michod, D. Mock, T. Monnin, R. Montgomerie, A.J. Moore, U.G. Mueller, R. 
Noë, S. Okasha, P. Pamilo, G.A. Parker, J.S. Pedersen, I. Pen, D. Pfennig, D.C. 
Queller, D.J. Rankin, S.E. Reece, H.K. Reeve, M. Reuter, G. Roberts, S.K.A. 
Robson, D. Roze, F. Rousset, O. Rueppell, J.L. Sachs, L. Santorelli, P. Schmid-
Hempel, M.P. Schwarz, T. Scott-Phillips, J. Shellmann-Sherman, P.W. Sherman, 
D.M. Shuker, J. Smith, J.C. Spagna, B. Strassmann, A.V. Suarez, L. Sundström, 
M. Taborsky, P. Taylor, G. Thompson, J. Tooby, N.D. Tsutsui, K. Tsuji, S. 
Turillazzi, F. Úbeda, E.L. Vargo, B. Voelkl, T. Wenseleers, S.A. West, M.J. West-
Eberhard, D.F. Westneat, D.C. Wiernasz, G. Wild, R. Wrangham, A.J. Young, 
D.W. Zeh, J.A. Zeh, and A. Zink. 2011. Inclusive fitness theory and eusociality. 
Nature. 471:E1–E4. 
Alexander, R. D., and G. Borgia. 1978. Group selection, altruism, and the levels of 
selection of life. Annual Review of Ecology, Evolution and Systematics. 9:449-74. 
Amdam, G.V., and R.E. Page. 2010. The developmental genetics and physiology of 
honeybee. Animal Behaviour. 79:973-980. 
Arnold, A.J., and K. Fristrup. 1982. The Theory of Evolution by Natural Selection – A 
Hierarchical Expansion. Paleobiology. 8(2):113-129.   
Baer, C. F., J. Travis, and K. Higgins. 2000. Experimental evolution in Heterandria 
formosa, a livebearing fish: group selection on population size. Genetics Research. 
76:169–178. 
Bashey, F., and C.M. Lively. 2009. Group Selection On Population Size Affects Life-
History Patterns In The Entomopathogenic Nematode Steinernema Carpocapsae. 
Evolution. 63-5: 1301–1311. 
Beukeboom L, C. Desplane. 2003. Nasonia. Current Biology. 13(22):R860. 
  117 
Beukeboom, L.W., and L. Van de Zande. 2010. Genetics of sex determination in the 
haplodiploid wasp Nasonia vitripennis (Hymenoptera: Chalcidoidea). Journal of 
Genetics. 89:333-339. 
Bijma P., and M. Wade. 2008. The Joint Effects of Kin, Multilevel Selection and Indirect 
Genetic Effects on Response to Genetic Selection. Journal of Evolutionary 
Biology. 21(5): 1178–1188. 
Borrello, M.E. 2010. Evolutionary Restraints: The Contentious History of Group 
Selection. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.   
Boyd, L.H., and Iversen G.R. 1979. Contextual Analysis: Concepts and Statistical 
Techniques. Wadsworth, Belmont CA.  
Boyd, R. and P.J. Richerson. 1985. Culture and the Evolutionary Process. University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago.  
Boyd, R. and P.J. Richerson. 2005. The Origin and Evolution of Cultures. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford.  
Brandon, R.N. 1982. Levels of Selection. Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science 
Association. 1:315-323. 
Brandon, R.N. 1990. Adaptation and Environment. Princeton University Press, 78-133. 
Brandon, R.N. 1994. Theory and Experiment in Evolutionary Biology. Synthese. 99:59-
73. 
Brandon, R.N. 1999. The Units of Selection Revisited: The Modules of Selection. 
Biology and Philosophy. 14:167-180. 
Brenden, F., and M.J. Wade. 1989. Selection within and between kin groups of the 
imported willow leaf beetle. The American Naturalist. 134(1):35-50. 
Brucker, R.M., and S.R Bordenstein. 2013. The Hologenomic Basis of Speciation: Gut 
Bacteria Cause Hybrid Lethality in the Genus Nasonia. Sciencexpress. July 18: 1-
5.  
Burton-Chellew, M.N., T. Koevoets, B.K. Grillenberger, E.M. Sykes, S.L. Underwood, 
K. Bijlsma, J. Gadau, L. Van de Zande, L.W. Beukeboom, S.A. West, and D.M. 
Shuker. 2008. Facultative Sex Ratio Adjustment in Natural Populations of Wasps: 
Cues of Local Mate Competition and the Precision of Adaptation. The American 
Naturalist. 172(3):393-404.  
Cassidy, J. 1981. Ambiguities and Pragmatic Factors in the Units of Selection 
Controversy. Philosophy of Science. 48(1):95-111.   
  118 
Charlesworth, B. 1981. Review of Natural Selection of Populations and Communities, by 
D.S. Wilson. Journal of Applied Ecology. 18:328-30. 
Charnov, E. L., Krebs, J. R. 1975. The evolution of alarm calls: altruism or manipulation? 
The American Naturalist. 109:107-12. 
Cohen, D., Eshel, I. 1976. On the founder effect and the evolution of altruistic traits. 
Theoretical Population Biology. 10:276-302. 
Collins, J.P. 1986. "Evolutionary Ecology" and the Use of Natural Selection in 
Ecological Theory. Journal of the History of Biology. 19(2):257-288. 
Collins, J.P. 2003. What can we learn from community genetics?  Ecology. 84:574-577. 
Coyne, J.A.  2012.  The  Demise  of  Group  Selection.  “Why  Evolution  is  True”  website.  
http://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2012/06/24/the-demise-of-group-
selection/ Accessed 9/5/2013.  
Craig, D. M. 1982. Group selection versus individual selection: an experimental analysis. 
Evolution. 36:271–282. 
Craig, J. V., and W. M. Muir. 1996. Group selection for adaptation to multiple-hen cages: 
beak-related mortality, feathering, and body weight responses. Poultry Science. 
75:294–302. 
Damuth, J. and I.L. Heisler. 1988. Alternative Formulations of Multilevel Selection. 
Biology and Philosophy. 3:407-430. 
Darwin, C. 1871. The Descent of Man, and Selection in relation to Sex. Republished 
1981 Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ. 
Dawkins, R. 1976. The Self Gene. Oxford University Press, Oxford.  
Dawkins, R. 1979. Twelve misunderstandings of kin selection. Zeitschrift Fur 
Tierpsychologie. 51:184-200. 
Dawkins, R. 1982. “Replicators and Vehicles”. King's College Sociobiology Group, eds., 
Current Problems in Sociobiology. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. pp. 
45-64. 
Dawkins, R. 1994. Burying the Vehicle. Peer commentary to Sober and Wilson 1994. 
Behavior and Brain Sciences. 17(4):616-617.  
Dawkins, R. 2000. Obituary for W.D. Hamilton. The Independent. 
http://edge.org/conversation/w-d-hamilton-an-obituary.  
  119 
Dugatkin, L.A. 2006. The Altruism Equation: Seven Scientists Search for the Origins of 
Goodness. Princeton University Press, Princeton.  
Dugatkin, L.A., H.K. Reeve. 1994. Behavioral ecology and levels of selection: dissolving 
the group selection controversy. Advances in the Study of Behavior. 23:101-133.  
Eldakar, O.T., and D.S. Wilson. 2011. Eight Criticisms Not to Make About Group 
Selection. Evolution. 65(6):1523-1526.  
Fisher, R.A. 1918. The correlation between relatives on the supposition of Mendelian 
inheritance. Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. 3:399–433 
Fisher, R.A. 1937. The design of experiments. Oliver & Boyd, Edinburgh. 
Fisher, R.A. 1941. Average excess and average effect of a gene substitution. Annals of 
Eugenics. 11:53–63  
Fisher, R.A. 1953. Population genetics. The Croonian lecture. Proceedings of the Royal 
Society B: Biological Sciences. 141:510–523 
Fisher, R.A. 1958. The genetical theory of natural selection. 2nd edition of 1930 Oxford 
University Press 1st edition. Dover Publications Inc., New York. 
Frank, S. 2011. Pathology from Evolutionary Conflict. Presentation at Sackler Colloquia 
In Light of Evolution V: Cooperation. Irvine, California, January 7-8.  
Garcia, C., and M.A. Toro. 1990. Individual and Group Selection for Productivity in 
Tribolium castaneum. Theoretical and Applied Genetics. 79(2):256-260.   
Getty, T. 1999. What do experimental studies tell us about group selection in nature? 
American Naturalist. 154(5):596-598.   
Ghiselin, M.T. 1974. A Radical Solution to the Species Problem. Systematic Zoology. 
23(4): 536-544. 
Gilbert, S.F., J. Sapp, and A.I. Tauber. 2013. A Symbiotic View of Life: We Have Never 
Been Individuals. The Quarterly Review of Biology. 87(4):325-341.  
Goodnight, C. J. 1985. The influence of environmental variation on group and individual 
selection in a cress. Evolution. 39:545–558. 
Goodnight, C.J. 1990a. Experimental studies of community evolution I: The response to 
selection at the community level. Evolution. 44(6):1614-1624.  
Goodnight, C.J. 1990b. Experimental studies of community evolution II: The ecological 
basis of the response to community selection. Evolution. 44(6):1625-1636. 
  120 
Goodnight, C.J. and L. Stevens. 1997. Experimental Studies of Group Selection: What do 
they tell us about group selection in nature?. American Naturalist. 150, 
Supplement.  
Goodnight, C.J., J.M. Schwartz, L. Stevens. 1992. Contextual Analysis of Models of 
Group Selection, Soft Selection, Hard Selection, and the Evolution of Altruism. 
The American Naturalist. 140(5):743-761.  
Gordon, J. N. Knowlton, D.A. Relman, F Rohwer, and M. Youle. 2013. Superorganisms 
and Holobionts. Microbe. 8(4)152-153. 
Gould, S.J. 2002. The Structure of Evolutionary Theory. Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge. 
Grillenberger, B.K., T. Koevoets, M.N. BurtonChellew, E.M. Sykes, D.M. Shuker, L. 
Van de Zande, R. Bijlsma, J. Gadau, and L.W. Beukeboom. 2008. Genetic 
structure of natural Nasonia vitripennis populations: validating assumptions of sex-
ratio theory. Molecular Ecology. 17:2854-2864.  
Hamilton, A., and C.C. Dimond. 2012. Groups, individuals, and evolutionary restraints: 
the making of the contemporary debate over group selection. Biology and 
Philosophy. 27(2):299–312 
Hamilton, W. D. 1967. Extraordinary sex ratios. Science. 156:477– 488. 
Hamilton,  W.D.  1964.  “The  Genetical  Evolution  of  Social  Behaviour”  (I  and  II).  Journal 
of Theoretical Biology 7: 17–52.   
Hamilton, W.D. 1996. Narrow Roads of Gene Land I. Freeman, Oxford. 
Harmon, O. 2010. The Price of Altruism. W.W. Norton and Company, New York. 
Heisler, I. L., and J. Damuth. 1987. A method for analyzing selection in hierarchically 
structured populations. The American Naturalist. 130:582–602. 
Henrich, Natalie, and Joseph Henrich. 2007. Why Humans Cooperate: A cultural and 
evolutionary explanation. Oxford University Press, Oxford.   
Hodgson, G.M. 1991. Hayek Theory of Cultural Evolution – An Evaluation in the Light 
of Vanberg Critique.  Economics and Philosophy. 7(1):67-82.  
Hull, D. 2001. Interactors Versus Vehicles. In Science and Selection: Essays on 
Biological Evolution and the Philosophy of Science. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge.  
Hull, D.L. 1976. Are Species Really Individuals?. Systematic Zoology. 25(2): 174-191 
  121 
Hull, D.L. 1978. A Matter of Individuality. Philosophy of Science. 45(3): 335-360. 
Hull, D.L. 1980. Individuality and Selection. Annual Review of Ecology, Evolution, and 
Systematics. 11:311-31 
Huxley,  T.H.  1893.  “The  Struggle  for  Existence  in  Human  Society.”  In  Evolution and 
Ethics, by T. H. Huxley. 9:195–236. Macmillan, London. 
Ivens AB, D.M. Shuker, L.W. Beukeboom, I. Pen. 2009. Host acceptance and sex 
allocation of Nasonia wasps in response to conspecifics and heterospecifics. 
Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. 276:3663-3669. 
Joblonski, D. 2008. Species Selection: Theory and Data. Annual Review of Ecology, 
Evolution, and Systematics. 39:501-524. 
Keller, E.F., and E.A. Lloyd. 1992. Keywords in Evolutionary Biology. Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge. 
Kelley, J.K. 1997. Fitness variation across a subdivided population of the annual plant 
Impatiens capensis. Evolution. 51(4):1100-1111.   
Kerr, B., G. Neuhauser, B.J.M. Bohannan, A.M. Dean. 2006. Local migration promotes 
competitive restraint in a host-pathogen "tragedy of the commons." Nature. 
442:75-78. 
Kropotkin, P.A. 1902. Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution. McClure Philips, New York. 
Lack, D.L. 1954. The natural regulation of animal numbers. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
Lack, D.L. 1966. Population Studies of Birds. Clarendon Press, Oxford.  
Leigh, E.G., Jr. 2010. The Group Selection Controversy. Journal of Evolution Biology. 
23:6-19. 
Lewontin, R. C. 1970. The Units of Selection. Annual Review of Ecology and 
Systematics. Vol 1:1-18 
Lewontin, R.C. 1962. Interdeme selection controlling a polymorphism in the house 
mouse. The American Naturalist. 96: 65–78. 
Lieberman, B.S. and E.S. Verba. 1995. Hierarchy Theory, Selection, and Sorting – A 
Phylogenetic Perspective. Bioscience. 45(6) 394-399. 
Lloyd E.A. 2005. Units and Levels of Selection. The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2005 Edition), E.N. Zalta (ed.) URL: 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2005/entries/selection-units/>. 
  122 
Lloyd, E.A. 2001. “Units and Levels of Selection: An Anatomy of the Units of Selection 
Debates.” In: Thinking about Evolution: Historical Philosophical and Political 
Perspectives. 276-290. 
Matessi, C., Jayakar, S.D. 1973. A model for the evolution of altruistic behavior. 
Genetics. 74:S174. 
Matessi, C., Jayakar, S.D. 1976. Conditions for the evolution of altruism under 
Darwinian selection. Theoretical Population Biology. 9:360-87. 
Maynard Smith, J. 1964. Group selection and kin selection. Nature. 201:1145-47. 
Maynard Smith, J. 1998. The Units of Selection. Novartis Foundation Symposium. 
213:203-217.  
Maynard Smith, J. and E. Szathmary. 1995. The Major Transitions in Evolution. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford.  
Maynard  Smith,  John.  1997.  “The  first  idea  of  population  regulation  by  group  selection.”  
Online video. www.webofstories.com/play/john.maynard.smith/. Posted 2008. 
Accessed 2/3/2014.  
McCauley, D.E. and M.J. Wade. 1980. Group Selection – The Genetic and Demographic 
Basis for the Phenotypic Differentiation of Small Populations of Tribolium 
castaneum. Evolution. 34(4):812-821.   
McFall-Ngaia, M., M.G. Hadfieldb, T.C.G. Bosch, H.V. Carey, T. Domazet-Loso, A.E. 
Douglas, N. Dubilier, G. Eberl, T. Fukami, S.F. Gilbert, U. Hentschel, N. King, S. 
Kjelleberg, A.H. Knoll, N. Kremer, S.K. Mazmanian, J.L. Metcalf, K. Nealson, 
N.E. Pierce, J.F. Rawls, A. Reid, E.G. Ruby, M. Rumpho, J.G. Sanders, D. Tautz, 
and J.J. Wernegreen. 2013. Animals in a bacterial world, a new imperative for the 
life sciences. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science. 110(9):3229-3236. 
Michod, R.E., and A.M. Nedelcu. 2003. On the Reorganization of Fitness During 
Evolutionary Transitions in Individuality. Integrative and Comparative Biology. 
43:64–73. 
Miller, J.H. and S.E. Page. 2007. Complex Adaptive Systems. Princeton University Press, 
New Jersey.  
Molbo D., and E.D. Parker Jr. 1996. Mating structure and sex ratio variation in a natural 
population of Nasonia vitripennis. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London —
Series B: Biological Sciences. 263:1703 – 1709. 
Muir, W. M. 1996. Group selection for adaptation to multiple-hen cages: selection 
program and direct responses. Poultry Science. 75:447–458. 
  123 
Nowak, M. A., C. E. Tarnita, and E. O. Wilson. 2010. The evolution of eusociality. 
Nature. 466:1057–1062. 
Nowak, M. A., C. E. Tarnita, and E. O. Wilson. 2011. Nowak et al. reply. Nature. 
471:E9–E10 
Okasha S. 2004a.  The  ‘‘averaging  fallacy’’  and  the  levels  of  selection.  Biology and 
Philosophy. 19:167–184 
Okasha, S. 2004b. Multilevel selection and the partitioning of covariance: a comparison 
of three approaches. Evolution. 58:486–494. 
Okasha, S. 2006. Evolution and the levels of selection. Oxford University Press, Oxford.  
Orzack, S.H., E.D. Parker Jr., and J. Gladstone. 1991. The Comparative Biology of 
Genetic Variation for Conditional Sex Ratio Behavior in a Parasitic Wasp, 
Nasonia vitripennis. Genetics. 127:583-599.  
Page R.E. Jr., and G.V. Amdam. 2007. The Making of A Social Insect: Developmental 
Architectures of Social Design. Bioessays. 29(4):334-343. 
Page, R.E. Jr., and M.K. Fondrk. 1995. The Effects of colony-level selection on the social 
organization of honey been (Aspis melifera L.) colonies: colony-level components 
of pollen hoarding. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology. 36:135-144. 
Parker, D.E., and S.H. Orzack. 1985. Genetic Variation for the Sex Ratio in Nasonia 
vitripennis. Genetics. 110:93-105.  
Price, G. R. 1970. Selection and covariance. Nature. 227:520-21. 
Price, G. R. 1972. Extension of covariance selection mathematics. Annals of Human 
Genetics. 35:485-90. 
Racey, P. 1997. Obituary: Vero Wynne-Edwards. The Independent. London, England. 
http://www.royalsoced.org.uk/cms/files/fellows/obits_alpha/wynne-
edwards_vero.pdf 
Ratclif, W.C., J.T. Pentz, M. Travisano. 2013. Tempo and Mode of Multicellular 
Adaptation In Experimentally Evolved Saccharomyces cerevisiae. Evolution. 
7(6):1573–1581. 
Reeve, H.K., and L. Keller. 1999. Levels of Selection: Burying the Units-of-Selection 
debate and Unearthing the Crucial New Issues. 3-14. In Levels of Selection in 
Evolution, edited by L. Keller. Princeton University Press, New Jersey.   
Richerson, P.J. and R. Boyd. 2005. Not by Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed 
Human Evolution. University of Chicago Press. Chicago.  
  124 
Rosenberg, E., O. Koren, L. Reshef, R. Efrony and I. Zilber-Rosenberg. 2007. The role of 
microorganisms in coral health, disease and evolution. Nature Reviews. 5:344-362. 
Singh, Y., J. Ahmad, J. Musarrat, N. Z. Ehtesham, and S.E. Hasnain. 2013. Emerging 
importance of holobionts in evolution and in probiotics. Gut Pathogens. 5(12):1-8.  
Slatkin, M., and M.J. Wade. 1978. Group Selection on a Quantative Character. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Science. 75(7):3531-3534. 
Sober,  E.  1984.  Sets,  species,  and  evolution:  comments  on  Philip  Kitcher’s  ‘‘species’’.  
Journal of the Philosophy of Science Association. 51:334–341. 
Sober, E. and D.S. Wilson. 1998. Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of 
Unselfish Behavior. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.  
Sober, E., and D.S. Wilson. 1994. A Critical Review of Philosophical Work on the Units 
of Selection Problem. Philosophy of Science. 61(4):534-555.  
Sterns, S.C. 1982. The Emergence of Evolutionary and Community Ecology as 
Experimental Sciences. Perspectives in biology and Medicine.  25(4):621-648. 
Stevens, L., C.J. Goodnight, and S. Kalisz. 1995. Multilevel Selection in Natural 
Populations of Impatiens capensis. The American Naturalist. 145(4):513-526). 
Sturtevant, A.H. 1938. Essays on evolution II. On the effects of selection on social 
insects. Quarterly Review of Biology. 13:74–76. 
Swenson, W., D.S. Wilson, and R. Elias. 2000a. Artificial Ecosystem Selection. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Science. 97(16):9110-9114. 
Swenson, W., J. Arendt, and D.S. Wilson. 2000b. Artificial Selection of microbial 
Ecosystems for 3-chloroaniline biodegradation. Environmental Microbiology. 
2(5):564-571. 
Szathmary, E., and J. Maynard Smith. 1995. The major evolutionary transitions. Nature. 
374:227-232. 
Treisman, M. 1983, Errors in the theory of the structured deme. Journal of Theoretical 
Biology. 102(3):339-346. 
Vrba, E.S. 1984. What is Species Selection? Systematic Zoology. 33(3):318-328.  
Wade, M.J. 1976. Group Selection among Laboratory Populations of Tribolium. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 73:4604–4607.  
Wade, M.J. 1977. An experimental study of group selection. Evolution. 31:134–153. 
  125 
Wade, M.J. 1978. A Critical Review of the Models of Group Selection. The Quarterly 
Review of Biology. 53(2): 101-114 
Wade, M.J. 1979. Primary Characteristics of Tribolium Populations Group Selected for 
Increased and Decreased Population-Size. Evolution. 33(2)749-764.   
Wade, M.J. 1980. Group Selection, Population Growth Rate, and Competitive Ability in 
the Flour Beetles Tribolium spp. Ecology. 61(5)1056-1064. 
Wade, M.J. 1982. Group Selection – Migration and the Differentiation of Small 
Populations. Evolution. 36(5)949-961.  
Wade, M.J. and C.J. Goodnight. 1991. Wright Shifting Balance Theory – An 
Experimental Study. Science. 253(5023):1015-1018.   
Wade, M.J. and D.E. McCauley. 1980. Group Selection – The Phenotypic and Genotype 
Differentiation of Small Populations. Evolution. 34(4):799-812.  
Wade, M.J., D.S. Wilson, C. Goodnight, D. Taylor, Y. Bar-Yam, M.A.M. de Aguiar, B. 
Stacey, J. Werfel, G.A. Hoelzer, E.D. Brodie III, P. Fields, F. Breden, T.A. 
Linksvayer, J.A. Fletcher, P.J. Richerson, J.D. Bever, J.D. Van Dyken, and P. 
Zee1. 2010. Multilevel and kin selection in a connected world. Nature. 463: E8-
E9.  
Werfel, J., and Y. Bar-Yam. 2004. The Evolution of Reproductive Restraint through 
Social Communication. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 101 
(30): 11019–11024. 
Werren, J.H. 1980. Sex Ratio Adaptations to Local Mate Competition in a Parasitic 
Wasp. Science. 208(4448):1157-1159.  
Werren, J.H., S. Richards, C.A. Desjardins, O. Niehuis, J. Gadau, J.K. Colbourne, et al. 
2010. Functional and evolutionary insights from the genomes of three parasitoid 
Nasonia species. Science: 327(5963)343 - 348. 
West, S.A., A.S. Griffin, A. Gardner. 2007. Social semantics: altruism, cooperation, 
mutualism, strong reciprocity, and group selection. Journal of Evolutionary 
Biology. 20(2):415-432. 
West, S.A., A.S. Griffin, and A. Gardner. 2008. Social semantics: how useful has group 
selection been? Journal of Evolutionary Biology. 21:374–385. 
Whitham, T.G., J.K. Bailey, J.A. Schweitzer, S.M. Shuster, R.K. Bangert, C.J. LeRoy, 
E.V. Lonsdorf, G.J. Allan, S.P. DiFazio, B.M. Potts, D.G. Fischer, C.A. Gehring, 
R.L. Lindroth, J.C. Marks, S.C. Hart, G.M. Wimp, S.C. Wooley. 2006. A 
Framework for Community and Ecosystem Genetics: From Genes to Ecosystems. 
Nature Reviews. 7:510-523.  
  126 
Whitham, T.G., W.P Young, G.D. Martinsen, C.A. Gehring, J.A. Schweitzer, S.M. 
Schuster, G.M. Wimp, D.G. Fischer, J. K. Bailey, R.L. Lindroth, S. Woolbright, 
and C.R. Kuske. 2003. Community and Ecosystem Genetics: A Consequence of 
the Extended Phenotype. Ecology. 84(3):559-573.  
Wild, G., A. Gardener, and S.A. West. 2010. Wild, Gardner & West reply. Nature. 463: 
E9-E10.  
Wild, G., A. Gardner, S.A. West. 2009. Adaptation and the evolution of parasite 
virulence in a connected world. Nature. 459:983–986. 
Williams, G.C. 1966.  Adaptation and Natural Selection. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton. 
Williams, G.C. 1992. Natural selection: domains, levels, and challenges. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 
Williams, G.C. 1996. Preface (1996), in Adaptation and Natural Selection. Princeton 
University Press. Princeton. 
Wilson, D. S. 1975. A theory of group selection. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences. 72:143-46 
Wilson, D.S. 1983. The Group Selection Controversy: History and Current Status. 
Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics. 14: 159-187 
Wilson, D.S. 1997. Biological Communities as Functionally Organized Units. Ecology. 
78(7):2018-2024. 
Wilson, D.S. 2008. Social Semantics: Toward a Genuine Pluralism in the Study of Social 
Behavior. Journal of Evolutionary Biology 21:368–373. 
Wilson, D.S. 2008. Social semantics: toward a genuine pluralism in the study of social 
behaviour. Journal of Evolutionary Biology. 21:368–373. 
Wilson, D.S., and E. Sober. 1994. Reintroducing Group Selection to the Human 
Behavioral Sciences. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 17(4):585-608. 
Wilson, D.S., and E.O. Wilson. 2007. Rethinking the Theoretical Foundation of 
Sociobiology. The Quarterly Review of Biology. 82(4):327-348.  
Wilson, DS. 1997. Biological communities as functionally organized units. Ecology. 
78(7):2018-2024.  
Winther, R.G., M.J. Wade, and C.C. Dimond. 2013. Pluralism in evolutionary 
controversies: styles and averaging strategies in hierarchical selection theories. 
Biology and Philosophy. 28(6):957-979 
  127 
Wright, S. 1929. Evolution in a Mendelian population. The Anatomical Record. 44:287. 
Wright, S. 1932. The Roles of Mutation, Inbreeding, Crossbreeding and Selection in 
Evolution. Cornell University Press, Ithaca. 
Wright, S. 1945. Tempo and mode in evolution: a critical review. Ecology. 26:415–419. 
Wright, S. 1978. The relation of livestock breeding to theories of evolution. Journal of 
Animal Science. 46: 1192–1200. 
Wright, S. 1980. Genic and organismic selection. Evolution. 34:825–843. 
Wynne-Edwards, V.C. 1962. Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behavior. Oliver 
and Boyd, Edinburgh. 
Wynne-Edwards, V.C. 1963. Intergroup Selection in the Evolution of Social Systems. 
Nature. 200(4907):623-626. 
Wynne-Edwards, V.C. 1964. Group Selection and Kin Selection: Response to Maynard-
Smith. Nature. 201(4924):1145–1147. 
Wynne-Edwards, V.C. 1985. “Backstage and upstage with “animal dispersion””. In: 
Dewsbury D (ed) Studying animal behavior: autobiographies of the founders. 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
Wynne-Edwards, V.C. 1993. A Rationale for Group Selection. Journal of Theoretical 
Biology. 162:1-22.  
  128 
APPENDIX A  
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR CHAPTER 1 
 
  129 
Source Strains for ASURx 
The Wolbachia that infect N. vitripennis come from two major stains. Even within 
the species, there can be cytoplasmic incompatibilities when N. vitripennis individuals 
carrying different strains mate (Bordenstein and Werren 2007). To avoid 
incompatibilities without resorting to antibiotics, the TMPRx strain was created by 
crossing eight strains of N. vitripennis against the LabII strain, which is known to posses 
both major strains of N. vitripennis Wolbachia. All nine strains used, the 8 strains plus the 
LabII strain, were received from the Werren laboratory at the University of Rochester 
during spring 2013 (Fig. S1).  
 
Creating the ASURx  
Approximately 10 males from each of the 8 strains recieved from the Werren 
laberatory were placed in a vial with 10 virgin females of the LabII strain. This created 8 
strains of N. vitripennis with the nuclear DNA that was standardized against the LabII 
cytoplasm and Wolbachia. After 1 generation, the 8 resulting standardized strains were 
combined into a single TMPRx population spread across 4 rearing tubes (Fig. S1). This 
was done by taking 8 mated females from each standardized strain, and placing 2 into 
each of 4 rearing tubes (Fig. S1). Thus, the experimental population was formed by 2 
individuals from each of 8 strains for a total of 16 females in each tube, with 4 tubes for a 
total population of 64.  
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Figure S.1 Creation of the ASURx laboratory population.  
 
 
Maintenance of ASURx 
To maintain allelic diversity in this population, I used the remixing techniques of 
Pannebakker and van de Zande (personal correspondence) for maintaining their High 
Variation Remix (HVRx) population of N. vitripennis. Each generation, after the adults 
emerged and mated, approximately half of the population was transferred to a new 
rearing tube. Then 40 host pupae were placed into each of the four new rearing tubes. 
After seven days, the hosts from each tube were collected and evenly redistributed across 
the four tubes. In this way, the 40 hosts that had been in tube 1 were redistributed so that 
10 were in tubes 1, 2, 3, and 4. Thus, after the redistribution, tube 1 consisted of 10 hosts 
from what had been tube 1, 10 hosts from what had been tube 2, 10 hosts from what had 
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been tube 3, and 10 hosts from what had been tube 4. After another seven days, the wasps 
emerge and were allowed to mate before moving the females to a new tube and beginning 
again.  
 
Methods for transferring and counting Nasonia  
The vials to be counted were placed in a bucket of icewater, then emptied onto a 
chilled petri dish left in contact with the icewater. This slowed the Nasonia, allowing for 
easy manipulation. After the population was counted, wasps were placed back in the vial 
and allowed to sit at room temperature until all adults were again active. The selected vial 
was then sealed with a cap that had a small hole so that mated females could move out of 
the vial and into another vial placed on top. The first five females that did so in the group 
treatment were used to start the first collective for the next generation, and four collective 
vials were subsequently created in the same way. Within the organismal treatment, five 
females were collected in the same way but each female was placed into a solitary vial to 
create the next generation.      
